TROY RAY BROCK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Troy Ray Brock appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession of methamphetamine, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his residence. The appellate court reversed because the officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe that the girlfriend who consented to the search had apparent authority to do so.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe Long had apparent authority to consent to the search. Officers may only rely on apparent authority if reasonable under the totality of circumstances, and must conduct further inquiry when the basis for authority is unclear. The court declined to address the double jeopardy issue in light of the reversal on the suppression issue.
[1] Law enforcement may only rely on a person's apparent authority to give consent to a search if such consent is reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.
[2] If the basis for a third party's asserted authority to consent to a search is not clear, law enforcement officers must conduct further inquiry before relying on the third…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Law enforcement may only rely on a person's apparent authority to give consent if such consent is reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.”
Establishes the standard for apparent authority to consent to searches
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaw enforcement was called by Brock's girlfriend, Sheila Long, who requested they come capture Brock at the property during a domestic dispute. Long w…
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Appellant seeks review of his convictions and sentences for both trafficking and possession of methamphetamine. Appellant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to suppress, and (2) whether appellant’s convictions for both trafficking and possession of methamphetamine violated double jeopardy principles. Because there is merit to the first issue, we reverse. In light of our decision on the first issue, we decline to address the second point on appeal.
As to the first issue, the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Although consent to enter the residence was given by appellant’s girlfriend, Sheila Long, there was not a reasonable basis for the officers conducting the search to believe Long had the apparent authority to give her consent. Law enforcement may only rely on a person’s apparent authority to give consent if such consent is reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Young, 974 So.2d 601, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In addition, if the basis for the asserted authority is not clear, the officer must conduct further inquiry before relying on the third party’s representations. Id.
Here, Long called the Jackson County Sheriffs Office to request law enforcement come out and capture appellant on the property, but she was no longer on the property, nor did she meet officers at the property when they arrived. When Long contacted the sheriffs office, she admitted she and appellant were engaged in a domestic dispute before she made the call. Furthermore, the officer who took the call could not recall the exact words Long used or whether she expressly stated she owned the property or was a resident on the property. Finally, a driver’s license record search of Long, conducted prior to officers’ arrival on the property, indicated the property in question was not her residence. Thus, the officers’ belief that Long had the apparent authority to consent to a search of the trailer without further inquiry was not reasonable and the warrantless entry was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is REVERSED.
VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
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King v. State, 79 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…ngs of both spouses in their jointly owned bedroom and closet. However, “[l]aw enforcement may only rely on a person’s apparent authority to give con [*239] sent if such consent is reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” Brock v. State, 24 So. 3d 703, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing State v. Young, 974 So. 2d 601, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). If the basis for the asserted authority is not clear, the officer must conduct further inquiry before relying on the third party’s representations. Id. Here,…
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Kohn v. State, 69 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…udgment required of law enforcement officers to determine whether a third person has the authority to consent to the entry and search of the premises is held to a “reasonableness” standard under the totality of the circumstances. See Brock v. State, 24 So. 3d 703, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). This objective standard was described in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 199, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) thusly: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable cauti…
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Ancrum v. State, 146 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…So. 3d 236, 238-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[L]aw enforcement may only rely on a person’s apparent authority to give consent [to search personal property] if such consent is reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” (quoting Brock v. State, 24 So. 3d 703, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). Un [*1220] der the circumstances shown here, we conclude that the officers were not required to conduct further inquiry about ownership of the cigarette pack before searching it. See id. at 289 (“If the basis for the asser…
Authorities Cited
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. 1990)
- State v. Young, 974 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)