STEPHEN BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Stephen Bell appealed an order modifying his sex offender probation after the trial court found he violated a condition by failing to comply with his probation officer's instruction to report daily. The appellate court reversed, holding that the daily reporting requirement constituted a new condition of probation not imposed by the trial court and therefore could not support a violation finding.
The court held that the probation officer's requirement of daily reporting constituted a new condition of probation that had not been imposed by the trial court and therefore could not support a finding of violation. A probation officer may only give routine supervisory directions necessary to carry out conditions imposed by the trial court, not instructions that essentially impose new conditions.
[1] A probation officer may give a probationer routine supervisory directions necessary to carry out conditions imposed by the trial court.
[2] An instruction by a probation officer that imposes a new condition of probation not imposed by the trial court cannot support a finding of violation.
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Establishes the legal standard distinguishing permissible supervisory directions from impermissible new conditions of probation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBell pleaded guilty in 2003 to lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve and was sentenced to three years imprisonment followed by twelve…
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Stephen Bell appeals an order modifying his sex offender probation based on a finding that he failed to comply with his probation officer’s instruction to report daily to the probation office. Because the instruction created a new condition of probation that had not been imposed by the trial court, we reverse and remand for the court to reinstate Bell’s probation.
In 2003, Bell pleaded guilty to one count of lewd or lascivious molestation on a child under twelve and was sentenced to three years of prison, followed by twelve years *713of sex offender probation. On June 5, 2008, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed alleging that Bell had violated condition seven (failing to comply with probation officer’s instructions). At the hearing, Bell’s probation officer testified that Bell had been unemployed for approximately seven months. She stated that she told Bell to begin reporting on a daily basis to her office with his job search forms. Bell did not report to his probation officer on June 4, 2008.
The trial court found that Bell had violated condition seven of his probation. The court entered an order that restored Bell’s sex offender probation, instructed Bell to report to the probation office as requested by his probation officer, and imposed electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act, section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2007).1 The court also ordered Bell to pay a $100 public defender fee and $100 in prosecution costs.
“[A] probation officer may give a probationer routine supervisory directions that are necessary to carry out the conditions imposed by the trial court.” Miller v. State, 958 So.2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). “However, an instruction that essentially imposes a new condition of probation is not a routine supervisory direction and cannot support a finding that the probationer is in violation.” Id. at 984-85.
We find that the probation officer’s requirement of daily reporting constituted a new condition of probation that had not been imposed by the trial court. See Voudry v. State, 641 So.2d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (finding that community control could not be revoked on the basis that defendant failed to make daily telephone contact with his community control officer when the condition was imposed by that officer and not by the court); Page v. State, 363 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (holding that trial court could not revoke for failure to make daily telephone contact with probation supervisor because requirement was not court-imposed). Therefore, the trial court erred in finding Bell in violation of condition seven.
Accordingly, we reverse the order modifying Bell’s probation and remand to the trial court with directions that Bell’s probation be reinstated. We also strike the $100 public defender fee and $100 in prosecution costs.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
CASANUEVA, C.J., and KELLY, J„ Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Person v. State, 83 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…to file job search logs. Because there was no orally pronounced or written order which required the filing of such documents, he could not have been violated on this ground. See Williamson v. State, 43 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Bell v. State, 24 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Morales v. State, 518 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The trial judge, however, found that he had violated condition L4 “by failing to being gainfully employed as evidenced by his failure to submit weekly job search logs as instru…
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C.B. v. State, 117 So. 3d 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ning a profit. Moreover, even if the term itself were insufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice, a probation officer may give supervisory directions, which are necessary to carry out the conditions of probation. Bell v. State, 24 So. 3d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). This authority stops short of permitting a probation officer to create a new condition of the defendant’s probation. Id. The distinction between a supervisory direction and a new condition is that a supervisory direction “s…
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Delarosa v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)…ged. But the imposition of a specific time to plug in the RTC device "essentially imposes a new condition of probation [that] is not a routine supervisory direction and cannot support a finding that the probationer is in violation." Bell v. State, 24 So. 3d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Miller v. State, 958 So. 2d 981, 984-85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)); cf. Messineo v. State, 174 So. 3d 1106, 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("[A] probation officer has no authority to impose additional conditions of probation, eve…
Authorities Cited
- Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Miller v. State, 958 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Amaya v. State, 641 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Voudry v. State, 641 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)