CRYSTAL MOTOR CAR COMPANY OF HERNANDO, LLC, APPELLANT,
v.
ANDREA BAILEY, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2009-12-31
No. 5D08-3729
MONACO, C.J., and SAWAYA, J„ concur.
24 So. 3d 789 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Crystal Motor Car Company appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a dispute over a motor vehicle purchase. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes about whether the arbitration agreement was validly executed, rather than deciding the motion without such a hearing.


Holding

The trial court was required to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing to resolve the substantial factual issue regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement before ruling on the motion to compel arbitration, pursuant to Florida Statute § 682.03(1).


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing when a substantial issue is raised as to the making of an arbitration agreement.

[2] A party's claim that their signature on an arbitration agreement is a forgery raises a substantial issue regarding the making of the agreement.

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Key Quotes

“The clear wording of the statute requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a party's motion to compel when there is a "substantial issue" regarding the making of the arbitration agreement.”

Establishes the court's interpretation of the statutory requirement for a hearing on contested arbitration agreement validity.

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Facts & Procedural History

Andrea Bailey purchased a motor vehicle from Crystal Motor Car Company and filed a complaint alleging sixteen claims of liability, including breach of…

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Opinion of the Court
PALMER, J.

PALMER, J.

Crystal Motor Car Company (Crystal Motor) appeals the non-final order entered by the trial court denying its motion to compel arbitration.1 Determining that Crystal Motor was entitled to receive an evidentiary hearing on its motion, we reverse.

Andrea Bailey filed a complaint against Crystal Motor alleging sixteen separate claims of liability arising out of an agreement to purchase a motor vehicle from Crystal Motor. Bailey alleged that Crystal Motor breached the terms of the agreement by seeking additional consideration for the transaction, taking possession of the car from Bailey without notice, and maintaining possession of Bailey’s trade-in vehicle.

Crystal Motor filed a motion to compel arbitration alleging that the parties’ motor vehicle agreement contained an arbitration clause applicable to Bailey’s claims. Bailey filed a response to the motion with an affidavit contending that she did not sign any arbitration provision and that her signature on the document presented with Crystal Motor’s motion to compel arbitration was a forgery.

In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court expressly found that a factual issue existed concerning the validity of Bailey’s signature. The court ruled:

The Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED as Plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the validity of the signature of the Plaintiff on the arbitration agreement document, thereby casting doubt on the validity of the arbitration agreement.

Crystal Motor contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled on its motion to compel arbitration without first holding an expedited eviden-tiary hearing since there were factual disputes as to whether Bailey executed a document containing an arbitration agreement. We agree.

Section 682.03 of the Florida Statutes governs proceedings to compel arbitration. The statute reads, in pertinent part:

682.03. Proceedings to compel and to stay arbitration
(1) A party to an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party thereto to comply therewith may make application to the court for an order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the *791terms thereof. If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue exists as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall grant the application. If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application.

§ 682.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The clear wording of the statute requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion to compel when there is a “substantial issue” regarding the making of the arbitration agreement. As such, the trial court should have conducted an evi-dentiary hearing before entering an order denying Crystal Motor’s motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MONACO, C.J., and SAWAYA, J„ concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …d., decisions from the other district courts of appeal have clarified that a trial Court should conduct an evidentiary -hearing when a' substantial issue regarding contract formation is raised, e.g., Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So. 3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Rowe, 932 So. 2d at 541-42; Tandem Health Care of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Whitney, 897 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Melamed, 425 So. 2d at 128. The question then becomes, “What constitutes a ‘substantial issue?’ ” I…
  • Fi-Evergreen Woods, LLC v. The Est. OF Va. A. Vrastil, 118 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)
    …ng of the agreement or provision,” the motion should be granted, but if, as here, there is a “substantial issue,” then at least a summary hearing is needed. § 682.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); see, e.g., Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So. 3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (reversing denial of motion to compel arbitration for failure to hold evidentiary hearing when nonmovant claimed agreement was never signed and signature on document was forgery). The hearing should occur “before the trial c…
  • Fi-Evergreen Woods, LLC v. Robinson, 135 So. 3d 331 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)
    …ear wording of [section 682.03(1) ] requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion to compel when there is a ‘substantial issue’ regarding the making of the arbitration agreement.” Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So. 3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding after the trial court expressly found a factual issue without first conducting an evidentiary hearing); see also Tandem Health Care Of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Whitney, 897 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2d DC…

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