JEFFREY DOBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jeffrey Doby appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition challenging postconviction court's treatment of it as a Rule 3.850 motion. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the petition was properly treated as a postconviction motion and was correctly dismissed as untimely under the two-year filing deadline.
The postconviction court properly treated the habeas petition as a Rule 3.850 motion seeking collateral attack on the conviction. The court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the judgment became final on June 14, 2000, and did not present newly discovered evidence or a cognizable freestanding claim of actual innocence.
[1] A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed in the circuit where the prisoner is detained.
[2] A court may treat a habeas corpus petition as a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850 when the petition seeks to collaterally attack a conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the postconviction court appropriately treated Mr. Doby's petition as a rule 3.850 motion because it sought to collaterally attack his conviction”
Establishes that a habeas petition can be recharacterized as a Rule 3.850 motion when it seeks collateral attack on conviction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoby was convicted in 1999 and his judgment and sentence became final on June 14, 2000, when the appellate court issued mandate in his direct appeal. …
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Jeffrey Doby appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, specifically challenging the postconviction court’s treatment of his petition as a motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Mr. Doby cites his actual innocence as the sole ground for his habeas petition. The postconviction court dismissed Mr. Doby’s claim as untimely, successive, and an abuse of process. We write only to clarify the reasons Mr. Doby’s petition was correctly treated as a postconviction motion filed under rule 3.850.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to be filed in the circuit where the prisoner is detained. § 79.09, Fla. Stat. (2008). In this instance, the Charlotte County Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Doby’s habeas petition because Mr. Doby is incarcerated in Hendry County. However, the postconviction court appropriately treated Mr. Doby’s petition as a rule 3.850 motion because it sought to collaterally attack his conviction. See Valdez-Garcia v. State, 965 So.2d 318, 322-23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
The postconviction court also appropriately dismissed Mr. Doby’s claim as untimely. Rule 3.850(b) requires that a motion for postconviction relief be filed within two years of the date the judgment and sentence become final in noncapital cases like this one. Mr. Doby’s judgment and sentence became final on June 14, 2000, when this court issued mandate in his direct appeal. See O’Neill v. State, 6 So.3d 630, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that a judgment and sentence becomes final when direct appeal proceedings are concluded). While rule 3.850(b)(1) recognizes an exception to this time limitation for newly discovered evidence, Mr. Doby does not cite newly discovered evidence but merely rehashes the evidence presented at his 1999 trial, the arguments presented in his 2000 appeal, and the claims raised in his 2001 motion for postconviction relief. Furthermore, the Florida state courts do not recognize such freestanding claims of actual innocence in rule 3.850 motions or habeas petitions. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1089 (Fla.2008), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1305, - L.Ed.2d -(2009).
Affirmed.
KELLY and CRENSHAW, JJ„ Concur.
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Theron Speights v. State, 202 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Frank Quesada, Judge. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Speights v. State, 202 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (table decision); McDonald v. State, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Doby v. State, 25 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Speights v. State, 11 So. 3d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table decision); Valdez-Garcia v. State, 965 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Henry v. State, 933 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006);…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008)
- Valdez-Garcia v. State, 965 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- O'Neill v. State, 6 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)