R.J.L., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2009-12-31
No. 5D09-149
PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.
25 So. 3d 639 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that an order deferring payment of court costs is not a final, appealable order. The denial of appellate counsel was moot.

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant challenged a trial court order that deferred payment of court costs and denied appointment of appellate counsel. The order was entered after…

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Topics
Appointment Of Appellate Counsel Final Appealable Order Mootness

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Opinion of the Court
COHEN, J.

COHEN, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s order entered after a review hearing that deferred, at Appellant’s request, the payment of court costs imposed pursuant to adjudicatory and disposition hearings conducted over six months earlier. This order is not a final, appealable order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.145(b). Further, any error regarding the payment deferral was not properly preserved and cannot be said to be adverse or prejudicial when entered pursuant to Appellant’s request. In any event, Appellant’s jurisdictional objection below was incorrect because his probation term, revoked and terminated in April 2008 for a violation of probation, was imposed anew for one year.

The trial court’s order also denied appointment of appellate counsel. Although this issue is moot because Appellant obviously has counsel, we observe that Appellant is entitled to appellate counsel under section 985.033(1), Florida Statutes (2007). The trial court is cautioned that Florida and federal law entitle the accused to the appointment of counsel.

Because the appeal concerns a nonfinal, non-appealable order and a moot issue, see Carlin v. State, 939 So.2d 245, 247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), we dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED.

PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

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  • Green v. State, 62 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …tipulated in his plea agreement. By entering a negotiated plea which called for a specific number of days to be awarded as credit, the appellant waived any claim that he was entitled to more credit than called for in that plea. See Hagan v. State, 25 So. 3d 639, 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“The inclusion of specific [*1149] language indicating the specific date from which the defendant’s credit for time served would count towards his current sentence is sufficient to demonstrate he knowingly and voluntarily w…
  • Maldonado v. State, 145 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
    …ation but before her sentence was imposed. Section 921.161, Florida Statutes (2011), entitles a defendant to jail time credit for the time he or she spends in county jail “before sentence.” A defendant may waive this entitlement. See Hagan v. State, 25 So. 3d 639, 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). But a waiver of jail time credit must be specific, voluntary, and clear from the face of the record. See White v. State, 995 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Hill v. State, 985 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); s…

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