MATTHEW RYBOLT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-01-15
No. 2D08-4998
KELLY and LaROSE, JJ„ Concur.
25 So. 3d 682 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Matthew Rybolt appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to nineteen drug offenses and his motion to modify his sentence. The court affirmed the denial of the plea withdrawal but reversed the denial of the sentence modification motion because the trial court lost jurisdiction by ruling beyond the sixty-day statutory window.


Holding

The court affirmed the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea because Rybolt failed to prove the plea was involuntary or induced by misadvice. The court reversed the denial of the sentence modification motion because the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on it when more than sixty days elapsed since sentencing without an extension of time being granted.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea must demonstrate that the plea was involuntary and that a manifest injustice requires correction.

[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the defendant fails to prove the plea was involuntary.

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Key Quotes

“To warrant relief on his motion to withdraw his plea, Rybolt was required to show that the plea was involuntary and that a manifest injustice required correction.”

Establishes the legal standard for withdrawing a guilty plea in Florida

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Facts & Procedural History

Rybolt was on probation when charged with nineteen drug offenses including armed trafficking in cocaine and various counts of possession and sale of c…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Matthew Rybolt was on probation when he was charged with nineteen drug offenses: armed trafficking in cocaine, trafficking in MDMA, four counts each of possession and sale of cocaine, two counts each of sale and possession of metham*683phetamine, two counts each of possession and sale of MDMA, and one count each of possession and sale of marijuana. Although he consistently maintained that he had never been armed, Rybolt entered into a best interests agreement to plead guilty to all charges in exchange for a thirty-year cap on sentencing. He also admitted to violating his probation. After he was sentenced to thirty years for the two trafficking convictions, with various minimum mandatory terms and lesser concurrent sentences for the remaining convictions, Rybolt filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which we have treated as a motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(0- Rybolt also sought a modification of his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). The motions were denied after an evidentiary hearing before the same judge who accepted the plea, and Rybolt now appeals the order denying relief.

To warrant relief on his motion to withdraw his plea, Rybolt was required to show that the plea was involuntary and that a manifest injustice required correction. See State v. Partlow, 840 So.2d 1040, 1042 (Fla.2003). The circuit court heard testimony by Rybolt and the defense attorney who represented him at the time of the plea. The court found that the plea was neither induced by misadvice nor made while Rybolt was under the influence of drugs obtained from his cellmate at the jail. Rybolt had the burden of proving that his plea was involuntary, and on this record we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in rejecting this claim. See Gunn v. State, 841 So.2d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the motion to withdraw plea.

Rybolt’s motion for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(c) was filed on the sixtieth day after his sentencing. Although he filed several amended motions, he never sought and the court never granted an extension of time to rule on the motions. We agree with Rybolt, and the State concedes, that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion to modify the sentence because more than sixty days had elapsed since the imposition of sentence. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(c) (establishing sixty-day windows during which criminal defendant may seek sentence modification); see also McCormick v. State, 961 So.2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Therefore, we reverse that portion of the order denying relief on the rule 3.800(c) motion.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

KELLY and LaROSE, JJ„ Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • FOX v. State, 166 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …ence, appellant’s motion was untimely. Once the 60-day period has expired, the trial court loses jurisdiction to consider a rule 3.800(c) motion to mitigate. See McCormick v. State, 961 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Rybolt v. State, 25 So. 3d 682, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“We agree with Rybolt, and the State concedes, that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion to modify the sentence because more than sixty days had elapsed since the imposition of sentence.”). The order mit…

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