GADSDEN JAI ALAI, INC. AND WASHINGTON COUNTY KENNEL CLUB, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING AND GRETNA RACING, LLC, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-01-15
No. 1D08-5655
PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ, concur.
26 So. 3d 68 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Gadsden Jai Alai and Washington County Kennel Club challenged a permit issued to Gretna Racing for quarter horse racing, claiming lack of standing for administrative proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the quarter horse racing permitting statute does not contemplate consideration of economic interests of competing pari-mutuel facilities, and that parties without independent standing cannot use constitutional challenges as a vehicle to gain standing in administrative proceedings.


Holding

The court affirmed that appellants lack standing because the quarter horse racing permitting statutes do not contemplate consideration of economic interests of other pari-mutuel facilities. Additionally, parties without an independent basis for standing cannot use constitutional challenges to gain standing in administrative proceedings; constitutional issues must be addressed in independent circuit court proceedings.


Headnotes

[1] A party seeking to contest a permit application must demonstrate that their substantial interests are affected, meaning they will suffer injury in fact and the injury is…

[2] Economic interests alone are insufficient to establish standing to challenge a permit application unless the permitting statute contemplates consideration of such interes…

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Key Quotes

“Prior decisions in licensing or permitting cases have made it clear that a claim of standing by third parties based solely upon economic interests is not sufficient [to establish standing] unless the permitting or licensing statute itself contemplates consideration of such interests.”

Establishes the core principle that economic interests alone are insufficient for standing in permitting cases unless the statute contemplates such interests

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Facts & Procedural History

Gadsden Jai Alai, Inc. and Washington County Kennel Club sought to challenge the issuance of a permit to Gretna Racing, LLC to conduct quarter horse r…

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Opinion of the Court
WOLF, J.

WOLF, J.

Appellants, Gadsden Jai Alai, Inc. and Washington County Kennel Club, challenge a final order of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), dismissing with prejudice appellants’ petition for administrative hearing based on a determination that appellants lacked standing. Appellants sought to challenge the issuance of a permit to Gretna Racing, LLC to conduct quarter horse racing. We affirm because the permitting statutes governing the issuance of permits for quarter horse racing facilities do not contemplate consideration of the economic interests of other types of pari-mutuel facilities. See Agrico Chem. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (finding in order to have standing to contest a permit application, a party’s substantial interests must be affected, meaning the party must demonstrate (1) the party “will suffer injury in fact”; and (2) the injury is “of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to protect,” which may include economic interests if the permitting statute was “meant to redress or prevent injuries to a competitor’s profit and loss statement.”); Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 15 So.3d 642, 652 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Prior decisions in licensing or permitting cases have made it clear that a claim of standing by third parties based solely upon economic interests is not sufficient [to establish standing] unless the permitting or licensing statute itself contemplates consideration of such interests.... ”). We determine this case is unlike Boca Raton Mausoleum, Inc. v. State Department of Banking & Finance, 511 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), where the statutory permitting scheme reviewed specifically contemplated competition and impact on existing facilities would be considered. See also Abbott Labs., 15 So.3d at 652 (discussing the different and more stringent considerations for standing in licensing versus other types of administrative proceedings).

Appellants raise a number of issues challenging DBPR’s determination that they lack standing, one of which we feel merits further discussion: whether parties whose substantial interests were not affected pursuant to the two-part test announced in Agrico Chemical Co., 406 So.2d 478, have standing to participate in an administrative proceeding when they raise constitutional challenges to statutory sections which they allege (1) directly affect the validity of the permit approval process; and (2) provide the basis for the argument that the statutory framework does not support consideration of their economic interests.

Appellants’ constitutional challenges relate to sections of chapter 550, Florida Statutes, which they assert subject quarter horse permit applicants to more relaxed standards than those which are applicable to applicants for all other types of parimutuel facilities. These standards include exclusion from (1) mileage restriction between pari-mutuel facilities; (2) requirements relating to zoning; (3) requirements for financial stability; and (4) requirements for approval by county referendum. §§ 550.334(1), 550.334(4), 550.0651, Fla. Stat.

Appellants correctly assert that parties with standing to initiate an administrative proceeding may raise constitutional issues within an administrative proceeding. Key *70 Haven Associated Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla.1982). Key Haven, however, specifically contemplates the party raising the constitutional challenge has an independent basis to participate in the administrative proceeding. In this case, as previously discussed, there is no independent basis for standing. We can find no case directly on point. While appellants’ arguments have some initial appeal, we determine the dangers of allowing parties to raise constitutional issues in order to gain standing to address other issues in the permitting process outweigh any arguable consideration of judicial economy. It is preferable under these circumstances to have the constitutional issues addressed in an independent circuit court proceeding.

The decision of DBPR is AFFIRMED.

PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, 123 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
    …f standing here. Additionally, Orange Park argues that this court recently distinguished Boca Ra-ton and limited it to its facts in Gadsden Jai Alai, Inc. v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 26 So. 3d 68, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). In Gadsden, this court found petitioners who sought to contest the issuance of a license to a competitor lacked standing because “the permitting statutes governing the issuance of permits for quarter horse racing facilities…
  • Vill. OF KEY Biscayne v. The Dep't OF Env't Prot., 206 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …missed request for administrative hearing for lack of standing); Washington County v. Nw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 85 So. 3d 1127, 1130-31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Gadsden Jai Alai, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 26 So. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Univ. of S. Fla. Coll. of Nursing v. State, Dep’t of Health, 812 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Indeed, case law confirms, and the Village concedes, that standing under the Administrative Procedure Act includes instance…
  • Daytona Beach Kennel Club, Inc. v. Dep't OF Bus., 33 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)
    …2d DCA 1981), and correctly concluded that DB Kennel Club lacked standing to challenge the issuance of a pari-mutuel wagering permit to DeBary. See Gadsden Jai Alai, Inc. v. State of Florida, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 26 So. 3d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). We further find no error in the failure to refer the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a hearing. The issue of standing is normally a question of law, as it was in this case. Dismissal is appropriate…

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