LEE VERNON JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-02-10
No. 2D08-2123
VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
27 So. 3d 211 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Negative Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

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Holding

The court held that while prohibiting contact with victims and ordering restitution for counseling are permissible conditions, prohibiting contact with all minors is not statutorily authorized.


Facts & Procedural History

Lee Johnson pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious molestation and received a sentence with several conditions, including no contact with victims, no c…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Lee Johnson pleaded guilty to two charges of lewd and lascivious molestation. The court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of fifteen years’ imprisonment but did not impose any probation. The court also imposed conditions requiring that Johnson have no contact with the victims of his crimes, that he have no contact with anyone under the age of 18, and that he pay the cost, if any, of the victims’ counseling while he was imprisoned. We strike the condition prohibiting contact with anyone under the age of 18 and affirm the two other conditions.

Section 921.244(1), Florida Statutes (2008), authorizes a court to prohibit an offender convicted of lewd and lascivious crimes from having contact with his victims.1 Section 775.089(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), permits restitution for a victim’s psychological care. We treat the condition requiring Johnson to pay for counseling as an order reserving jurisdiction to award such restitution. Because the court has not held a hearing and has not determined an amount to be paid, Johnson’s challenge is premature. See Robbins v. State, 641 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

Thus, two of the imposed conditions are statutorily authorized. We find no authority for the third condition, prohibiting contact with anyone under the age of 18. Accordingly we strike that condition.

Affirmed in part; stricken in part.

VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Hendricks v. State, 34 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …e Hazuri court’s distinction of Avila was that in Avila, the jury had requested a read-back, while in Hazuri, it had requested to view the transcripts. Hazuri, 23 So. 3d at 859-60. The Fourth District repudiated this distinction in Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). There, as in Hazuri, the jury requested to view the trial transcript. Barrow, 27 So. 3d at 215. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel suggested that the court advise the jury of its right to request a read-back. Id. at 215-16.…
  • Hazuri v. State, 91 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 2012)
    …w of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Hazuri v. State, 23 So. 3d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 49 So. 3d 747 (Fla. 2010), Avila v. State, 781 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and Roper v. State, 608 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The…
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  • Marlyn Tracey v. Wells Fargo Bank, 264 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
    …issues only." (emphasis added) ); Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 2 So. 3d 209, 213 (Fla. 2009) ("This Court does not question the wisdom of a statute but instead applies the statute according to the Legislature's direction."); cf. Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (criticizing trial judge's reliance on "an inflexible rule for a decision that the [*1168] law places in the judge's discretion"). Second, it would conflict with decades of Florida law that ties the scope of remand in civil…

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