MELVIN GROSSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
MAURICE POLLACK, DESERT INN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, EDWARD BERMAN, YIDDY BLOOM AND VERNA BLOOM, HIS WIFE, HARRY BLOOM AND LENORA BLOOM, HIS WIFE, I. H. BLUMENFIELD AND LILLIAN BLUMENFIELD, HIS WIFE, ABE BROWNSTEIN AND EMMA BROWNSTEIN, HIS WIFE, H. C. ENTERPRISES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND CHASE FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, OF MIAMI BEACH, APPELLEES
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Architect Grossman sought to enforce a mechanics' lien against property owners for architectural services rendered to a prospective lessee, but the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants because the underlying lease was never delivered and thus never came into existence, preventing the creation of any statutory lien.
An architect cannot enforce a statutory mechanics' lien without the existence of a lease, because the statutory lien requires substantial compliance with the mechanics' lien statute, and without a valid lease there is no privity between the architect and the fee owners.
“Since such a lien is purely statutory it is necessary that there be a substantial compliance with the statute for the lien to come into existence.”
Establishes that mechanics' liens require strict statutory compliance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrossman performed architectural services for a prospective lessee, clearing land, staking out property, and erecting a sign. A proposed lease was sig…
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Appellant, as plaintiff, sought enforcement of a lien against the owners of the fee, for architectural services rendered to a a lessee. See Sections 84.02, 84.03(2) Fla. Stat., F.S.A. Although the complaint alleges that the land was cleared, the property staked out, and a sign erected by the lessee, no work was undertaken pursuant to the plans prepared by plaintiff. Upon motion for summary final decree by defendant it conclusively appeared that the lease in question was never delivered. During the period in which plaintiff’s work was performed, the prospective lessee and lessor were negotiating for a lease, and a proposed lease was signed and placed in escrow pending the procurement by the lessee of construction funds. These funds were never procured and the leasehold interest never came into being. Based upon this established fact, the Chancellor entered a summary final decree for the defendant fee owners. The decree is affirmed.
Section 84.03(2), supra, is a portion of the mechanics’ lien law. Since such a lien is purely statutory it is necessary that there be a substantial compliance with the statute for the lien to come into existence. See Masterbilt Corporation v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 149 Fla. 644, 6 So.2d 818, and cases cited therein. In Brenner v. Smullian, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 44, 46, involving this subsection it was stated:
“The above section has been construed by this court to make the lessor’s interest in the property liable for any construction work done by the lessee only if the lease agreement required the lessee to make the alterations or to effect the improvements involved. An acquiescence on the part of the lessor to the improvements does not render the interest of the lessor liable but affects only the interest of the lessee in the premises.”
Without the existence of a lease there was no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. See Lee v. Sas, Fla.1951, 53 So.2d 114. The law recognizes the right of a person to execute a deed or other instrument conveying an interest in property and place it in escrow to be delivered only upon the happening of certain contingencies. When the deed is not delivered out of escrow nothing passes. Houston v. Adams, 85 Fla. 291, 95 So. 859; Bould v. Coe, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 273. The Chancellor correctly concluded that when it was established that plaintiff’s employer never had a lease, plaintiff could not have a statutory mechanics’ lien.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON, J., concur.
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Zell v. Cobb, 566 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…appens or the condition is performed, the instrument deposited in escrow does not take effect as a fully executed contract. Love, 100 Fla. at 1379, 131 So. at 146. Moreover, when nothing passes out of escrow, no interest passes. Grossman v. Pollack, 100 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). The record reflects that the appellees deposited all of the checks tendered by the leveraged buy-out investors into escrow to insure that funds would be available without delay if an interested party was. later offered the o…
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Ospina-Baraya v. Heiligers, 909 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…erson to execute a deed or other instrument conveying an interest in property and place it in escrow to be delivered only upon the happening of certain contingencies. When the deed is not delivered out of escrow nothing passes.” Grossman v. Pollack, 100 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). As such, if Heiligers’s one-third interest is placed in escrow for Ospina, that one-third interest will not pass to Ospina until his obligations under the marital settlement agreement terminate. [*475] However, as he will st…
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Amatrudi v. Blake, 117 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…established that in order to have á statutory lien the plaintiff must bring himself under the terms of the statute. E. g., Sheffield-Briggs Steel Products, Inc. v. Ace Concrete Service Co., Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 924; Grossman v. Pollack, Fla.App.1958, 100 So. 2d 660. Section 84.01, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides for liens under certain circumstances against the interest of an “owner”. This section defines owner as follows: “ ‘Owner’ means the owner of real property or any interest therein who enters into a contr…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Al Brenner v. Smullian, 84 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1955)
- Houston v. Adams, 85 Fla. 291 (Fla. 1923)
- The Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 6 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1942)
- Lee v. Sas, 53 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1951)
- Bould v. COE, 63 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1953)