GREGORY L. PORRAS, APPELLANT,
v.
ARLISE PORRAS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order allowing relocation because the appellant failed to establish a record basis demonstrating trial court error.
[1] A party seeking to object to a notice of intent to relocate with children must file an objection as required by statute.
[2] An appellate court cannot correct errors of the trial court that are not demonstrated by the record.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former wife filed a notice of intent to relocate with the children. The appellant, pro se, appealed the trial court's order allowing relocation, c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Child Relocation cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant, Gregory L. Porras [“Por-ras”], pro se, appeals an order allowing his former wife to relocate with their children to Michigan. The appealed order recites that the parties were divorced in 2007 and that the former wife filed her notice of intent to relocate with the children on or about February 5, 2009. According to the appealed order, a certified copy of the notice of intent to relocate with the children was served on Porras on February 10, 2009, and no objection was filed.1 Accordingly, as required by section 61.13001(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2009), the trial court entered the order allowing the relocation, established a post-relocation schedule of visitation and transportation scheme and, finally, reserved jurisdiction to modify or enforce the order.
*1190Upon examination of the appealed order, we issued an order directing Porras to show cause, why we should not summarily affirm the appeal because, after having been served with the notice of intent to relocate with the children, Porras offered no objection as required by section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2009).
In response to our order to show cause, Porras filed a response that is detailed and articulate. He explains that in February 2009, being aware that his ex-wife was talking about moving to Michigan with the children, he consulted with an attorney in DeLand, seeldng representation to keep his children in Florida. He was told that a $500 deposit was required in order for the attorney to represent him. He claims that he was served with notice of the intent to relocate on March 13, 2009. He has provided a copy of the envelope showing that the post office had attempted to deliver the letter on three prior occasions: February 11, February 25 and March 3, 2009. Upon receipt of the notice, on March 13, 2009, he prepared a detailed letter to the attorney with whom he had consulted, and his girlfriend took the letter and the required $500 deposit to the attorney’s office on March 16, 2009. He claims that he contacted the attorney’s office on several occasions beginning on March 18, but was unsuccessful in speaking to the lawyer. Then, on April 11, 2009, he received a copy of the appealed order allowing his former wife to take the children to Michigan. Upon receipt of the order, he insistently demanded that counsel return his telephone call, which counsel did on April 13, 2009. He contends that counsel told him that he had not been given the papers in time to take action and that he had been too busy with other clients to return his call. The attorney asked if he wished him to “file an appeal” and Porras told him “no.” The attorney offered to return the $500 fee, which was promptly done. Thereafter, Porras, acting pro se, filed an appeal in this court, seeking review of the trial court’s order.
The problem with Porras’ appeal is that there is no record basis to conclude that the trial court erred. Importantly, the trial court was correct in concluding that there had been no objection filed by Por-ras in response to the notice of intent to relocate, which is required under the statute. Based on his own explanation of events, it appears that his failure to lodge an objection resulted from a combination of his own delay in retaining counsel and counsel’s subsequent failure to take action or communicate with Porras during the approximately two weeks prior to the court’s entry of the order on March 31, 2009.
Assuming Porras’ recitation of the facts is accurate and that he was not served with the notice of intent until March 13, the trial court’s assumption that Porras had been served on February 10 was erroneous. However, if this finding by the trial court was erroneous, then it should have been promptly brought to the trial court’s attention so that the error could have been corrected or, at least, so that evidence could be placed in the record to show that the service date was March 13, not February 10, and that the order entered on the notice of intent was premature. Because this was not done, we have no record basis to determine when, in fact, Porras was served. The puipose of an appellate court is to correct errors of the trial court and, on this record, no error has been demonstrated.2 If Porras is to obtain *1191relief, it will have to be from the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
MONACO, C.J. and EVANDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Wright, 172 So. 3d 982 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…. The primary function of the appellate court is to correct errors committed by the trial court. See Correa v. U.S. Bank N.A., 118 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Morton’s of Chicago, Inc. v. Lira, 48 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Porras v. Porras, 29 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Bardol v. Martin, 763 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see also Barrett v. Barrett, 951 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the appellant’s claim of trial court error was waived because he failed to argue the error in th…