STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JORGE ALONSO, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a downward departure sentence imposed on Jorge Alonso for robbery with a deadly weapon, finding that the trial court's determination that the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner lacked competent substantial evidence. The court remanded for resentencing, allowing the trial court to consider alternative statutory grounds for departure.
The trial court's determination that the offense was unsophisticated was not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore could not justify a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(j). Because Alonso knew his codefendant wore a mask and the men possessed and intended to use walkie-talkies, the offense could not be characterized as artless, simple, and not refined.
[1] A trial court's decision to impose a downward departure sentence involves a two-step process: first, determining if a valid legal ground for departure exists with adequat…
[2] A downward departure sentence based on the offense being committed in an unsophisticated manner requires competent substantial evidence supporting the finding of unsophis…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse”
The statutory ground cited by the trial court for imposing a downward departure sentence under section 921.0026(2)(j)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlonso entered a nolo contendere plea to robbery with a deadly weapon after his masked codefendant robbed a store manager at knifepoint and Alonso dro…
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Jorge Alonso was charged with and entered a nolo contendere plea to robbery with a deadly weapon. Alonso’s lowest permissible sentence was forty-eight months in prison. Pursuant to section 921.0026(2)0), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides “[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse,” the trial court imposed a downward departure sentence of two years of community control, followed by three years of probation. We find the trial court’s determination that the offense was unsophisticated is not supported by competent substantial evidence and reverse.
A decision to impose a downward departure is a two-step process. State v. Jerry, 19 So.3d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing State v. Owens, 848 So.2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). First, the trial court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support. Id. (citing Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla.1999)). If a valid ground exists and it is adequately supported by the record, then the sentencing court proceeds to the second step where it must determine whether it should depart, i.e., whether departure is the best sentencing option for the defendant. Id. (citing Banks, 732 So.2d at 1068).
In the instant case, on appeal, the State contested only whether the trial court could depart, asserting that there was not competent substantial evidence to support a finding of unsophistication. Alonso drove the get-away car after his masked codefendant robbed, at knifepoint, a store manager, leaving work for the night. Two witnesses to the robbery saw the license plate number on the get-away car, so police were able to apprehend Alonso and his codefendant, who both gave detailed confessions. At sentencing, Alonso admitted knowing his codefendant was wearing a mask during the robbery but denied knowing he had a knife. Alonso also admitted driving the get-away car, which contained a pair of walkie-talkies that the men planned to, but never used, in the robbery. *267He admitted to storing the contraband taken from the victim in a safe at his home upon his eodefendant’s request.
Because Alonso knew that his code-fendant wore a mask and the men possessed and intended to use walkie-talkies, we cannot agree with the trial court that the offense was unsophisticated. See Staffney v. State, 826 So.2d 509, 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (using the phrase “ ‘artless, simple and not refined’” to define unsophisticated (quoting State v. Merritt, 714 So.2d 1153, 1154 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998))). Though we hold that Alonso does not qualify for a departure under subsection (j), the defense supported its motion for a downward departure by contending that Alonso also qualified under sections 921.0026(2)(b) and (e). Because the trial court never specifically made a ruling as to these alternative grounds submitted by the defense, the trial court may consider them in resentencing Alonso.
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Flavio Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…his case, we conclude that the trial judge relied upon constitutionally impermissible considerations in determining the extent of the downward departure. A trial court’s decision to grant a downward departure is a two-step process. State v. Alonso, 31 So. 3d 265, 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “First, the court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it (step 1).” Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067…
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Kezal v. State, 42 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…had committed it in an unsophisticated manner, i.e., that there was some articulable way in which her offense was committed in a more artless, more simple, and less refined manner than other first-time DUI manslaughter offenses. See State v. Alonso, 31 So. 3d 265, 267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing State v. Merritt, 714 So. 2d 1153, 1154 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), to define the term “unsophisticated” as “artless, simple and not refined”). When Kezal failed to do this, the trial court rejected her request for a d…
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State v. Hunter, 65 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…to depart, because the defendant proved neither amenability to treatment nor that treatment was unavailable in the prison system. We disagree and affirm. A trial court’s decision to grant a downward departure is a two-step process. State v. Alonso, 31 So. 3d 265, 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “First, the court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it (step 1).” Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Donald B. Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999)
- Staffney v. State, 826 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- State v. Merritt, 714 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Doyle L. Newton v. State, 848 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- State v. Tirone Alonza Jerry, 19 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)