MICHELLE MCROY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michelle McRoy was found in direct criminal contempt after her cell phone rang during a juvenile court proceeding, which she explained occurred because she had loaned the phone to her sister who failed to turn it off upon return. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the contempt conviction, holding that the trial court failed to recite specific facts supporting the contempt finding and that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that McRoy's conduct embarrassed, hindered, or obstructed the court.
The court reversed the contempt conviction on two independent grounds: first, the trial court's order violated Rule 3.830 by failing to recite evidentiary facts supporting the contempt finding, and second, even if the order were facially sufficient, there was no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that McRoy's actions embarrassed, hindered, or obstructed the court in the administration of justice or lessened its authority or dignity.
[1] Direct criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct that embarrasses, hinders, or obstructs the administration of justice, or lessens the court's…
[2] A finding of direct criminal contempt must be supported by a recitation of the specific facts underlying the contemptuous conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.830 requires that the judgment of guilt of contempt include a recital of those facts underlying the charged contempt upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. This requirement cannot be dismissed as merely a technical requirement.”
Establishes the strict procedural requirement for contempt orders to specify facts, not mere conclusions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcRoy attended a juvenile court proceeding and followed the judge's initial instruction to turn off her cell phone. During the proceeding, she loaned …
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While attending a juvenile court proceeding, Michelle McRoy’s cell phone rang, drawing the attention of the presiding judge. Ms. McRoy was asked by the court why her phone was not turned off as the court instructed at the commencement of the proceedings. Ms. McRoy explained that she had turned her phone off as directed. However, while in court, she loaned the phone to her sister who went outside to make a call and returned the phone to her without turning it off. Ms. McRoy admitted that she did not check whether the phone was off when her sister returned the phone. Apparently viewing this conduct as contumacious, the trial court found Ms. McRoy in direct criminal contempt, forfeited the cell phone, and ordered the Orange County Sheriffs Department to destroy it. Ms. McRoy appeals and we reverse.
Contempt is an act tending to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or to lessen the court’s authority or dignity. Richey v. McLeod, 137 Fla. 281, 188 So. 228, 229 (1939). Contempt does not exist just because a judge feels aggrieved or vexed. Via v. State, 633 So.2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Direct criminal contempt is summary punishment for conduct that occurs in the presence of the court. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.830. Direct criminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Braisted v. State, 614 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988).
Rule 3.830 requires that the judgment of guilt of contempt include a recital of those facts underlying the charged contempt upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. This requirement cannot be dismissed as merely a technical requirement. Gidden v. State, 613 So.2d 457, 460 (Fla.1993). Purely conclusory statements will not meet the requirement of a recitation of facts. For example, cit*275ing the contemnor’s “unjudicious, unethical and intemperate conduct before the court” is insufficient. See Ray v. State, 352 So.2d 110, 111-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Here, neither the written order nor the oral pronouncement of the court recited evidentia-ry facts supporting the finding of contempt. In its entirety, the substantive portion of the contempt order provides: “Michelle McRoy was found guilty of contempt of court. Cell phone is forfeited and to be destroyed by the Orange County Sheriffs Office.” The trial court’s oral statements at the contempt proceeding were equally lacking in specificity. This alone would require reversal for the entry of a proper order.
Even if the order was facially sufficient, we would reverse the conviction of direct criminal contempt as there is no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. McRoy’s actions, annoying as they undoubtedly were, embarrassed, hindered or obstructed the court in the administration of justice, or lessened the court’s authority or dignity. The power of contempt must be used only rarely and with circumspection. See State v. Clemmons, 150 So.2d 231, 234 (Fla.1963). “The provocation must never be slight, doubtful or of shifting interpretations. The occasion should be real and necessary, not murky, and not ameliorated in some less formal manner.” Schenck v. State, 645 So.2d 71, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Trial judges must be allowed to control them courtrooms. They must have the tools suitable to the purpose when the loss of control is threatened and the dignity and purpose of the court are challenged. However, because of the potency of the powerful remedy of criminal contempt, we must carefully guard the requirements for its use, premised only on indisputable record support. Id. Because such proof is lacking here, we reverse the order of contempt.
REVERSED.
MONACO, C.J., and JACOBUS, J., concur.
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A.W. v. State, 137 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…ial court in the administration of justice or which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity.” M.W. v. Lofthiem, 855 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “Contempt does not exist just because a judge feels aggrieved or vexed.” McRoy v. State, 31 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing Via v. State, 633 So. 2d 1198, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150(a) controls direct contempt proceedings for juveniles. It provides: [Direct] contempt may be punished summarily if t…
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Michaels v. Loftus, 139 So. 3d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…s arm, palm extended upward and out or in a “stop” mode, seeking to “shush” Mr. Von Zamft for interrupting Mr. Michaels’ redirect examination. The law requires a charge of direct criminal contempt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McRoy v. State, 31 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). We review such orders on an abuse of discretion standard. Rudolph v. State, 832 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Michaels v. State, 773 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Thomas v. State, 752 So. 2d 679, 685 (Fla. 1st…1 / 2
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M.J. v. State, 202 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…le is the contemnor, Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150. The rules permit the trial court to summarily punish a defendant for direct criminal contempt if the conduct at issue was actually committed in the presence of the court. McRoy v. State, 31 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). “The purpose of criminal contempt is ‘to punish assaults or aspersions upon the authority and dignity of a court or judge’, not to avenge personal affronts.” Smith v. State, 954 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1988)
- Gidden v. State, 613 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Clemmons, 150 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963)
- RAY v. State of Fla. & the Honorable J. Robert Durden, 352 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Schenck v. State, 645 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- VIA v. State, 633 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Braisted v. State, 614 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Richey v. McLeod, 137 Fla. 281 (Fla. 1939)