JOSE CAMINO, APPELLANT,
v.
CARL'S FURNITURE, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2010-03-17
No. 3D09-2956
Before COPE, WELLS, and SALTER, JJ.
32 So. 3d 162 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2010)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's order transferring venue to Palm Beach County, holding that a mandatory venue selection clause in a furniture purchase contract applied only to disputes arising from buyer default in payment, not to product quality claims.


Holding

The venue selection clause applies only to disputes arising from buyer default in payment and does not apply to product quality claims. The clause's placement within the 'Default' section, where the surrounding language addresses payment defaults and remedies, indicates the parties intended it to apply only to payment-related disputes.


Headnotes

[1] A venue selection clause in a contract is interpreted based on the intent of the parties and the language used in the provision.

[2] A venue selection clause located within a section of a contract addressing default in payment may be interpreted to apply only to disputes arising from such default.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because of the placement of the language, we conclude that this venue selection clause applies only in default payment cases, which is not the case here.”

The court's holding that the venue clause's location within the 'Default' section restricts its application to payment disputes only.

Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant purchased a custom leather sofa for over $4,000 and paid in full. He later sued the furniture seller in Miami-Dade County alleging the sofa …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
COPE, J.

COPE, J.

This is an appeal from an order transferring venue to Palm Beach County based on a provision in a purchase contract. We reverse.

The appellant purchased a leather sofa which was custom made. The price was over $4,000 and the price was paid in full. The appellant sued the appellee alleging that the sofa turned out not to be leather and it turned out to be poorly manufactured. The plaintiff filed suit in Miami-Dade County and the defendant moved to transfer venue based on a mandatory venue selection clause in the purchase contract. The mandatory venue selection clause language on the reverse side of the contract is placed in the middle of a section entitled “Default.” The first two or three sentences deal with default in payment. This is followed by the language requiring venue for a dispute to be in Palm Beach County.

The mandatory venue selection clause reads as follows:

7. DEFAULT — In the event buyer cancels or otherwise does not adhere to the overall terms of the sales contract, Revolving Charge Agreement, Credit Card Agreement, buyer forfeits to seller any deposit, or payment amount as liquidated damages to be used for ordering, restocking, storage, financing and administrative expenses associated with the original sales contract. In addition buyer agrees that seller’s retention of these amounts shall be in addition to any other remedy to which seller is otherwise entitled, pursuant to the default provision of the Revolving Charge Agreement o[r] Credit card agreement. Legal venue for all disputes shall be Palm Beach County. Unless a separate written Revolving Charge Agreement or Credit Card agreement exists full payment for the sales contract is due and payable upon receipt of the merchandise, SELLER reserves the right to levy 1.5% interest per month, 19.56 Annual Percentage Rate, on any outstanding balances past due and unpaid by buyer. SELLER shall also be entitled to recover from buyer attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the enforcement of the terms of this agreement.

Because of the placement of the language, we conclude that this venue selection clause applies only in default payment cases, which is not the case here. See Sauder v. Rayman, 800 So.2d 355, 358 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (in interpreting forum selection clause, Court looked to the intent of the parties and the language used in the particular forum provision).

We reverse.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw