ZANDER KELLY, APPELLANT,
v.
CLARA COLSTON, K/N/A CLARA COLLINS, APPELLEE
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A former husband appeals a final judgment on parental responsibility that severely restricted his visitation rights by requiring his personal presence during all time-sharing and prohibiting him from leaving the child with relatives or friends. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court imposed this unique restriction without making sufficient factual findings regarding the alleged violence, the role of family members, or the husband's employment constraints.
The trial court's visitation order is reversed and remanded because while the court made a general finding of concern about violence and lack of supervision, it failed to make specific findings regarding the frequency, nature, and severity of the violence, the role of family members and friends in alleged violent behavior, and the husband's employment situation that would allow compliance with the order. Such specific findings are necessary to support the unique remedy imposed.
[1] A trial court must make specific factual findings to support a unique restriction on parental visitation.
[2] A trial court's order limiting a parent's visitation must be accompanied by findings detailing the frequency, nature, and severity of any alleged violent behavior.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's order, while initially appearing to grant liberal time-sharing, in fact, severely limits the former husband's visitation. Visitation is limited to only those periods in which the former husband is not working and is personally able to be with the minor child.”
Establishes that despite appearing generous on its face, the trial court's order imposed severe practical restrictions on the father's visitation rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring the former husband's time-sharing with the minor child, the child allegedly witnessed or was subjected to acts of violence or was left without …
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The former husband seeks review of a final judgment determining issues of parental responsibility. The former husband alleges, among other things, that the trial court erred in placing restrictions on his visitation without providing appropriate factual findings. Because of the lack of findings to support the unique restriction *187imposed in this case, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In the final order, the trial court noted it was “concerned that during times the minor child has been left with the [former husband’s] relatives without the [former husband] present, the child has witnessed or been subjected to acts of violence or left without proper supervision.” Based on this finding, the trial court allowed the former husband liberal time-sharing to include Christmas Break, Easter Break, and five weeks over the summer; however, the court directed that:
The Respondent Father must be personally present during all of his timesharing with the minor child. The Respondent Father may not leave the child with relatives or friends during the Father’s timesharing. The Father forfeits his timesharing for any time he is not able to be physically present with the minor child. The Petitioner Mother is allowed to pick the child up at any time the child is left unsupervised by the Respondent Father.
A trial court is required to “determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child ....”§ 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). The determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by evaluating over 20 factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child. § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). While a trial court need not address each of these factors independently, a trial court must make a finding that the time-sharing schedule is in the child’s best interests. Clark v. Clark, 825 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing Duchesneau v. Duchesneau, 692 So.2d 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)).
Here, the trial court’s order, while initially appearing to grant liberal time-sharing, in fact, severely limits the former husband’s visitation. Visitation is limited to only those periods in which the former husband is not working and is personally able to be with the minor child. He is totally restricted from leaving the child with any member of his family or any of his friends. While certain allegations were made in a pre-hearing Motion for Testimony and Attendance of Minor Child which, if true, support a total limitation of unsupervised visitation as opposed to the limitation ordered, the trial court made no findings as to those allegations and the findings made were insufficient to support the unique remedy fashioned here.*
The severe restriction imposed in this case must be accompanied by specific findings concerning the frequency, nature, and severity of the violence as well as details concerning what role family members and friends played in the alleged violent behavior. The order is also silent as to what extent the husband’s employment situation would allow him to comply with the trial court’s order. Without these specific findings, it is impossible for us to conduct appropriate appellate review.
The order of the court determining visitation with the minor child is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a new order or to conduct further proceedings as it deems appropriate to address the best interests of the child. However, the present order shall remain *188in effect until the trial court enters a new order upon remand.
LEWIS and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
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Lissette C. Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…ent that a trial court engage in a discussion as to each of the factors, although a discussion of the relevant factors can be helpful in determining whether the trial court’s judgment is supported by competent substantial evidence. Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Adair v. Adair, 720 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). That said, this is a very close case. In the final judgment, the trial court stated: “respondent failed to present any evidence demonstrating that it was unsafe for…
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Winters v. Brown, 51 So. 3d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…d interests of the child. § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2008). “While a trial court need not address each of these factors independently, a trial court must make a finding that the time-sharing schedule is in the child’s best interests.” Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citations omitted). The requisite findings must either be stated on the record or set out in the order. Clark v. Clark, 825 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). A trial court’s ultimate finding that an award of primary re…
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Hoff v. Hoff, 100 So. 3d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…s issue because it was not preserved for review. See Dorsett v. Dorsett, 902 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Mondello v. Torres, 47 So. 3d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). To support her argument, the Wife relies on cases such as Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), which held the trial court erred when it failed to make the appropriate factual findings based on the factors set forth in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes and when it failed to make a finding that the timesharing schedule is…
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- Baratta v. Valley OAK Homeowners' Ass'n AT THE Vineyards, Inc., 891 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Clark v. Clark, 825 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Shep Harris, Jr. v. Zenoria T. McKINNEY, 20 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- Duchesneau v. Duchesneau, 692 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)