D.M.H., APPELLANT,
v.
JOYCE PIETILLA, ADMINISTRATOR, HALIFAX MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLEE
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D.M.H. appeals the denial of her habeas corpus petition challenging her involuntary inpatient placement under Florida's Baker Act, arguing that the hearing was unlawfully delayed because it was not held within five calendar days as she contends the statute requires. The court affirms, holding that Florida's civil procedure rules govern the computation of the five-day deadline, excluding weekends and holidays.
The court held that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 governs the computation of the five-day time period for holding a hearing on an involuntary inpatient placement petition, and therefore Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the calculation. The hearing deadline is five working days, not five calendar days, and D.M.H.'s confinement is not unlawful on this basis.
[1] When a statute prescribes a time period for action, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 governs the computation of that time period unless the statute contains specific…
[2] Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(a), Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded when computing a time period of seven days or less.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Legislature's use of different terms in different parts of the same statute is 'strong evidence that different meanings were intended.'”
Establishes the interpretive principle D.M.H. relied upon to argue for five calendar days
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.M.H. filed a petition for involuntary inpatient placement under Florida's Baker Act. She subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the…
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D.M.H. appeals the denial of her petition for -writ of habeas corpus. The issue D.M.H. raises is whether her confinement is unlawful because the hearing on her Baker Act1 petition, which sought involuntary inpatient placement, was not held within five calendar days. We affirm.
When a petition for involuntary placement is filed under the Baker Act, either involuntary outpatient or involuntary inpatient placement may be sought. §§ 394.4655(6)(a)l„ 394.467(6)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2008). If involuntary outpatient placement is sought, the trial court must hold a hearing “within 5 working days.” § 394.4655(6)(a)l. If involuntary inpatient placement is sought, the trial court must hold a hearing “within 5 days.” § 394.467(6)(a)l. D.M.H. seizes on the difference in language to argue that because section 394.4655(6)(a)l. uses “working” days, the omission of that word in section 394.467(6)(a)l. reflects a legislative intent that the hearing for involuntary inpatient placement be held in five calendar days.
We recognize the Legislature’s use of different terms in different parts of the same statute is “ ‘strong evidence that different meanings were intended.’ ” Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 446 (Fla.2006) (quoting State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997)). However, this principle is not dispositive in this case because of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.010 and 1.090.
The rules of civil procedure apply to “all actions of a civil nature and all special statutory proceedings,” subject to certain exceptions not applicable to this case. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010. Rule 1.090 governs the computation of time periods under the rules of civil procedure, a court order, or “any applicable statute.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(a). When a statute prescribes action be taken within a certain time period, “[r]ule 1.090 governs the computation of time absent specific computation provisions to the contrary.” Canonico v. Callaway, 26 So.3d 53, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In relevant part, rule 1.090(a) provides that Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded when the prescribed time period is seven days or less. Because section 394.467 does not specifically indi*802cate how the five-day time period is to be calculated, rule 1.090 governs. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010; Canonico, 26 So.3d at 54.
Based on the foregoing, we reject D.M.H.’s argument that her hearing on involuntary inpatient placement had to be held within five calendar days of the petition being filed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of her petition for writ of habeas corpus.2
AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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- Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2006)
- State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997)
- Canonico v. Callaway, 26 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)