GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
KUTASHA P. SHAZIER; TERCINA S. JORDAN; AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, LLC, A FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATION; RETHELL BYRD CHANDLER, AS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF JAMELIA A. CHANDLER, A MINOR; CAROLYN E. PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD CHRISTEEGIA A. PRICE; THE ESTATE OF CAMELIA Y. BYRD, LIDA JEAN PARKER, WHITNEY MARSHALL, TENISHA MARSHALL, AND MONICA STEELE, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-03-10
No. 1D09-2595
HAWKES, C.J., and CLARK, J., concur.
34 So. 3d 42 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Geico appeals a summary judgment that found coverage under its family automobile insurance policy for an accident involving a rental car. The court reversed, holding that the rental car did not qualify as a "temporary substitute auto" because it was being driven by an unauthorized driver in violation of the rental agreement, thereby revoking the owner's (Avis's) permission for use.


Holding

No. The rental car did not qualify as a "temporary substitute auto" because the policy required the vehicle to be used "with the permission of the owner." Jordan's unauthorized use automatically revoked Avis's permission to Shazier, and therefore the rental car was not being used with Avis's permission when the accident occurred.


Headnotes

[1] A "temporary substitute auto" under a family automobile insurance policy is not covered when used by an unauthorized driver, as such use terminates the owner's permission…

[2] The owner of a rental vehicle, not the renter, possesses the authority to define the scope of permissible use of the substitute vehicle.

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Key Quotes

“[A] private passenger, farm, or utility auto or trailer, not owned by you, temporarily used with the permission of the owner. This vehicle must be used as a substitute for the owned auto or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”

The policy's temporary substitute auto provision requiring use "with the permission of the owner."

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Facts & Procedural History

Kutasha Shazier owned a Ford Expedition covered under a Geico policy. When the Expedition developed transmission problems, Shazier rented a Hyundai So…

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Opinion of the Court
ROBERTS, J.

ROBERTS, J.

This appeal arises from a final summary judgment determining that coverage existed under a family automobile insurance policy issued by the appellant, Geico Indemnity Company (“Geico”), for an accident involving a rental car. Geico argues that there was no coverage under the policy because the rental car did not qualify as a “temporary substitute auto.” We agree and reverse.

Kutasha Shazier owned a Ford Expedition. The Ford Expedition was covered under the policy issued by Geico to Shazier and her husband. The policy contained a standard “temporary substitute auto” provision which also extended coverage to:

[A] private passenger, farm, or utility auto or trailer, not owned by you, temporarily used with the permission of the owner. This vehicle must be used as a substitute for the owned auto or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

(Emphasis modified.)

When the Ford Expedition began experiencing transmission problems, Shazier rented a Hyundai Sonata (“the rental car”) from Avis Rent-A-Car System, LLC (“Avis”). Pursuant to the rental agreement, Shazier was the only person authorized to drive the rental car. The rental agreement provided in pertinent part:

NO ADDITIONAL OPERATORS ARE AUTHORIZED OR PERMITTED WITHOUT AVIS’ PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT OR APPLICABLE STATE LAW.
15. Prohibited Use of the Car. Certain uses of the car and other things you or a driver may do, or fail to do, will violate this agreement. A VIOLATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH, WHICH INCLUDES USE OF THE CAR BY AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER, WILL AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATE YOUR RENTALE.]

(Emphasis removed.)

Subsequently, the rental car was involved in an accident while being driven by Tercina Jordan, an unauthorized driver. Six of the passengers in the rental car sustained injuries and one passenger died. The passengers or their representatives brought personal injury actions against Shazier, Jordan, and Avis. Geico, in turn, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment alleging that it owed no duty to defend and/or indemnify because the policy provided no coverage to Shazier or Jordan for the injuries sustained by the passengers. One of the passengers moved for summary judgment on the grounds that coverage existed because the rental car qualified as a “temporary substitute auto.” Geico also moved for summary judgment asserting that no coverage existed because the rental car did not qualify as a “temporary substitute auto” as it was not being used with Avis’s permission. The trial court agreed with the passenger and entered final summary judgment in the passenger’s favor.

Under the policy, in order for coverage to attach in this case, the “temporary substitute auto” must have been used with the *44permission of Avis. As the owner, Avis had the authority to define the scope of permissible use of the rental car. See Duncan Auto Realty, Ltd. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 754 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“[T]he owner of the temporary substitute vehicle, not its user, possesses the authority to define the scope of permissible use of the substitute vehicle.”). As evidenced by the rental agreement, Avis did just that. Avis granted Shazier permission to use the rental car so long as she was the only person who did so. Jordan’s use of the rental car automatically revoked the permission granted to Shazier by Avis. Therefore, because it was not being used with Avis’s permission, the rental car did not qualify as a “temporary substitute auto” and no coverage existed under the policy.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with directions to the trial court to enter final summary judgment in favor of Geico.

HAWKES, C.J., and CLARK, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Rethell Byrd Chandler v. GEICO Indem. Co., 78 So. 3d 1293 (Fla. 2011)
    …LEWIS, J. Petitioners seek review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Geico Indemnity Co. v. Shazier, 34 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), on the basis that it conflicts with the decisions of this Court in Susco Car Rental System, of Florida v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.1959), and Roth v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1972). In Shazier, the distr…
    1 / 2
  • Garcia v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 807 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2015)
    …ive the car. After the third trial, the jury returned a verdict in GEICO’s favor on that issue. Garcia moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the district court denied. The district court relied in part on Geico Indem. Co. v. Shazier, 34 So. 3d 42 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010), quashed sub nom. Chandler v. Geico Indem. Co., 78 So. 3d 1293 (Fla.2011), which rejected the implied consent doctrine as a matter of law. Accordingly, the verdict established 'that Edgar did not reasonably believe that he ha…

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