BRYAN A. EXILE AND ELLIOT M. BLOOM, APPELLANTS,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2010-05-19
No. 3D09-2768
Before WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
35 So. 3d 118 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Third District Court of Appeal upheld Miami-Dade County Code Section 21-281, which prohibits convicted sexual offenders from residing within 2,500 feet of schools. The court rejected appellants' arguments that state law preempted the local ordinance or that it conflicted with a less restrictive state statute.


Holding

The ordinance is valid and remains in full force. The legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of sexual predators, and the 2,500-foot provision does not conflict with the state's 1,000-foot requirement because a person can comply with the ordinance without violating the statute.


Headnotes

[1] A county ordinance prohibiting convicted sexual offenders from residing within 2500 feet of a school is not invalidated by state law when the legislature has not clearly…

[2] Implied preemption is a severely restricted and strongly disfavored doctrine.

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Key Quotes

“The legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of the field of sexual predators, so as to invoke the severely restricted and strongly disfavored doctrine of 'implied preemption.'”

Establishes the stringent standard required to find implied preemption and finds no legislative intent to preempt local ordinances on this subject.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants Bryan A. Exile and Elliot M. Bloom challenged Miami-Dade County Code Section 21-281, which prohibits persons convicted of specified sexual …

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

As the trial court held in an excellent opinion, we conclude that Section 21-281 of the Miami-Dade County Code 1, which prohibits convicted sexual offenders from *119residing within 2500 feet of a school, is not invalidated by Florida law and therefore remains in full force and effect. Neither of the appellants’ contentions to the contrary is well taken:

(a) The legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of the field of sexual predators, so as to invoke the severely restricted and strongly disfavored doctrine of “implied preemption.” See Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 968 So.2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), reversed on other grounds 28 So.3d 880 (Fla.2010); City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla.2006); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 1075, 1077 (Fla.1984); Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County, 894 So.2d 1011, 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved sub. nom., Phantom of Brevard v. Brevard County, 3 So.3d 309, 315 (Fla.2009); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), rev. denied, 789 So.2d 346 (2001) (“The courts should be careful in imputing intent on behalf of the Legislature to preclude a local elected governing body from exercising its home rule powers.”); Tallahassee Mem. Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and

(b) The 2500 foot provision is not in cognizable “conflict” with the less restrictive 1000 foot buffer zone provided by Section 794.065(1)2 Florida Statutes. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So.2d 1160 (Fla.1989) (holding ordinance did not conflict with statute because a party could comply with the ordinance without violating the statute); Metro. Dade County v. Santos, 430 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So.2d 661, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 949 (1977); E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1150 (5th Cir.1970) (holding a county ordinance that required outdoor signs to be set back 200 feet from streets did not conflict with a state statute that required outdoor signs be set back 15 feet from the streets because a person could comply with the County ordinance without violating the state statute). Compare Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (expressly distinguishing Jordan Chapel and E.B. Elliott).

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Tran Constr., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 77 So. 3d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 255.20(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008); Liberty Cnty. v. Baxter’s Asphalt & Concrete, Inc., 421 So. 2d 505 (Fla.1982); Exile v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 35 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).…
  • Calderon v. State, 93 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …ces, and are on probation, are forbidden from establishing residence within 1000 feet of any school, day care, park, or playground. Section 21-281(a) increases the exclusionary residence zone to 2500 feet. As we stated in Exile v. Miami-Dade County, 35 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), “[t]he legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of the field of the post-conviction treatment of sexual predators, so as to invoke the severely restricted and strongly disfavored doctrine of ‘implied preemption…
  • …the legislature has not clearly preempted local regulation of the field of non-disciplinary investigations involving police officers so as to invoke the “severely and strongly disfavored doctrine of ‘implied preemption.’ ” Exile v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 35 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Conñict We also discern no conflict between the County ordinance and the PBR because as the Florida Supreme Court in Phantom of Brevard, Inc., has confirmed, a conflict between an ordinance and statute will not be found wh…

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