CLAYTON A. GEE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Clayton Gee was convicted as a habitual traffic offender and pleaded to a sentence of 364 days in county jail. When he failed to appear for sentencing due to circumstances beyond his control, the trial court imposed a much harsher 48-month prison sentence without determining whether the failure to appear was willful. The appellate court reversed, holding that a trial court cannot impose a harsher sentence than agreed upon in a plea agreement unless evidence supports a finding that the defendant's failure to appear was willful.
A trial court is not permitted to ignore a plea agreement and impose a harsher sentence unless evidence supports a finding that the defendant's failure to appear was willful. Where a defendant provides a credible explanation for the failure to appear and the trial court makes no findings on whether the failure was willful, the conviction must be reversed and remanded for sentencing in accordance with the original plea agreement.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by imposing a harsher sentence than agreed upon in a plea agreement when a defendant's failure to appear for sentencing was not willfu…
[2] A defendant's failure to appear for sentencing is not willful if the defendant communicates the reasons for the absence to the court prior to the scheduled appearance and…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a defendant fails to timely appear for sentencing as required by a plea agreement, the trial court is not permitted to ignore the agreement and impose a harsher term unless the evidence supports a finding that the defendant's failure to appear was willful.”
Establishes the controlling legal rule that a harsher sentence can only be imposed if willfulness is proven
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGee was convicted as a habitual traffic offender of driving with a revoked license and negotiated a plea agreement calling for 364 days in county jail…
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Clayton A. Gee, who was convicted as a habitual traffic offender of driving while his license was revoked, challenges his forty-eight-month prison sentence. After approving a negotiated plea of 364 days in county jail for this offense, the trial court deferred Gee’s sentencing date. But for reasons beyond his control — which were promptly communicated to the court — Gee was unable to appear as scheduled. When Gee did appear for sentencing, the trial court, without even considering whether his failure to appear was willful, imposed the much harsher sentence of forty-eight months in prison. The trial court abused its discretion in this regard, and the State has candidly conceded error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for imposition of the agreed-upon sentence.
If a defendant fails to timely appear for sentencing as required by a plea agreement, the trial court is not permitted to ignore the agreement and impose a harsher term unless the evidence supports a finding that the defendant’s failure to appear was willful. See Ingmire v. State, 9 So.3d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Robinson v. State, 946 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In this case, Gee faxed a letter that reached the court prior to the original sentencing date. In the letter, Gee explained that he was in north Florida without any funds or means of transportation and was unable to reach the person he paid to give him a ride. He further stated that he had attempted to contact his lawyer but that counsel was away from his office on an emergency. Gee specifically stated: “I was trying to request a postponement for a later date. I am not trying to avoid this and get in any more trouble. I have called everyone I can think of for help.”
When Gee did appear before the trial court for sentencing, he further explained the circumstances of his failure to appear. No one questioned his credibility, and the trial court never addressed or made findings on whether his failure to appeal was willful. Therefore, as in Ingmire, 9 So.3d at 1282, and Lowery v. State, 22 So.3d 745, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), we reverse and remand for the trial court to sentence Gee in accordance with the original plea agreement with appropriate credit for time served.
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ„ Concur.
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Peacock v. State, 77 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…rt improperly found that defendant’s failure to surrender in court at 9:00 a.m. was willful based solely on the fact that the arrest report showed that defendant was arrested almost two hours after he was supposed to have surrendered); Gee v. State, 38 So. 3d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reversing for enforcement of negotiated plea of 364 days in county jail where the trial court never made findings on whether the defendant’s failure to appear was willful; defendant sent letter to trial court before sentenci…
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Hawkins v. State, 138 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…encing was willful, prior to ruling on whether said absence was violative of a negotiated plea agreement. See Neeld v. State, 977 So. 2d 740, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Palmore v. State, 82 So. 3d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Gee v. State, 38 So. 3d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (noting same); Peacock v. State, 77 So. 3d 1285, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (noting same). If a defendant’s failure to appear is beyond his control, only in the most merciless and draconian system of justice could such failure…
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Jones v. State (Fla. 5th DCA 2024)…date, that he had prior felonies, and that he was otherwise not entitled to mitigation. Neither side addressed whether Jones’s failure to appear at the April 27th hearing was willful, a requirement to void the Quarterman agreement. See Gee v. State, 38 So. 3d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“If a defendant fails to timely appear for sentencing as required by a plea agreement, the trial court is not permitted to ignore the agreement and impose a harsher term unless the evidence supports a finding that the defend…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ceasar Robinson v. State, 946 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Lowery v. State, 22 So. 3d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
- Ingmire v. State, 9 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)