TODD NORWOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Todd Norwood appeals the denial of his postconviction motion for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising twelve grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reversed the summary denial of ground one (speedy trial violation) and remanded for amendment opportunity, but affirmed the denial of all other grounds.
The court reversed the summary denial of ground one and remanded for the postconviction court to strike the claim with leave to amend, allowing Norwood the opportunity to allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the ten-day recapture window. The court affirmed the denial of all other grounds. The court certified a conflict with decisions from the First and Fifth Districts and certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.
[1] A postconviction court must allow a movant leave to amend a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for discharge based on a speedy trial violation…
[2] An appellate court must review all claims summarily denied by the circuit court in a postconviction appeal, regardless of whether those claims have been briefed by the ap…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This court has previously remanded similar claims, pursuant to Spera, for the movant to be given the chance to amend if the movant could allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period.”
Establishes the court's application of Spera precedent requiring opportunity to amend speedy trial claims
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNorwood was convicted of attempted manslaughter with a weapon (charged as attempted first-degree murder) and sentenced to fifteen years as a prison re…
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Todd Norwood appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. We reverse the summary denial of ground one and remand for the postconviction court to strike the claim with leave to amend. In all other respects, we affirm the denial of the motion.
Norwood was charged with attempted first-degree murder but was found guilty of attempted manslaughter with a weapon and sentenced to fifteen years as a prison releasee reoffender. Norwood’s postcon-viction motion, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raised twelve grounds. In the postconviction court’s order of August 28, 2007, the court summarily denied grounds one, two, three, four, five, seven, eight, nine, and eleven. The court ordered an evidentiary hearing for grounds six, ten, and twelve and denied those claims after a hearing, in an order entered on May 8, 2008.
*337We agree with the postconvietion court’s reasons for denying grounds two, three, foui*, five, seven, eight, nine, and eleven as set forth in the court’s order of August 28, 2007. We also conclude that grounds six, ten, and twelve were properly denied after the evidentiary hearing. However we reverse the summary denial of ground one and remand for the postconvietion court to allow Norwood leave to amend this claim pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007).
In ground one, Norwood alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to move for discharge based on a speedy trial violation. Norwood alleged, among other things, that his trial commenced on October 25, 2004, which was beyond the 175-day speedy trial time. He alleged that his counsel moved for a continuance on April 14, 2004, after he had been awaiting trial for 204 days. The postconvietion court rejected this claim because Norwood failed to demonstrate prejudice in that he failed to allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the ten-day recapture window once the speedy trial period had expired.
This court has previously remanded similar claims, pursuant to Spera, for the movant to be given the chance to amend if the movant could allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period. See Smith v. State, 988 So.2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Gamble v. State, 996 So.2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Furthermore, this court considers all issues summarily denied by the circuit court irrespective of the fact that such issues have not been briefed. See Walton v. State, — So.3d —, 2010 WL 1507628, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D856 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 16, 2010). Therefore, we reverse the summary denial of ground one and remand with instructions to strike the claim giving Norwood leave to amend within a specific period of time, in accordance with Spera, 971 So.2d at 761. We also certify conflict with Watson v. State, 975 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA), appeal dismissed, 987 So.2d 1211 (Fla.2008); Williams v. State, 24 So.3d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ward v. State, 19 So.3d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); and Austin v. State, 968 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). And, as we did in Walton, we certify to the supreme court the following question of great public importance:
WHEN CONSIDERING A POSTCON-VICTION APPEAL, UNDER RULE 9.141(b)(2)(D), MUST THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AFFORD REVIEW OF ALL SUMMARILY DENIED CLAIMS EVEN WHEN THE PRO SE APPELLANT, OR ONE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, HAS FILED A BRIEF BUT HAS NOT BRIEFED OR OTHERWISE FURTHER PURSUED CERTAIN CLAIMS?
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for further proceedings, conflict certified, and question certified.
LaROSE, J., Concurs.
KELLY, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons stated in Walton v. State, — So.3d — (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), I dissent from the portion of the opinion reversing the summary denial of ground one.
KELLY, Judge,
Concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons stated in Walton v. State, — So. 3d — (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), I dissent from the portion of the opinion reversing the summary denial of ground one.
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Cunningham v. State, 131 So. 3d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…this court from at least December 2000 to October 2010 was different from the policies in other Florida district courts of appeal. See Corn v. McNeil, No. 3:08cv199/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL5811434, at *16 (N.D.Fla. Nov. 24, 2010); see also Norwood v. State, 39 So. 3d 336 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), withdrawn and superseded, 67 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Mr. Cunningham’s appeal concerned a postconviction motion where some grounds were summarily denied in a nonfinal order and the remaining grounds were later denied after…
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Tensley v. State, 46 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…t to Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2007), this court remands “for the movant to be given the chance to amend if the movant [*1044] c[an] allege that the State could not have brought him to trial within the recapture period.” Norwood, v. State, 39 So. 3d 336, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Therefore, we reverse the summary denial of the last ground addressed by the postconviction court in its order and remand with instructions to strike that claim with leave to amend within a specific period of time in accorda…
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Southern v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. (Duval County) (M.D. Fla. 2025)…ge" in the relevant rules of appellate procedure regarding whether all issues must be briefed, Doc. 7 at 4 (citing Walton v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D856 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), withdrawn and superseded, 58 So. 3d 887 (Feb. 11, 2011); Norwood v. State, 39 So. 3d 336 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), withdrawn and superseded, 67 So. 3d 270 (Mem) (Mar. 16, 2011)). Petitioner received an evidentiary hearing on his 2018 Rule 3.850 Motion. Ex. J at 38-39. As such, he was required to file an appellate brief. Fla. R. App. P. 9.141…
Authorities Cited
- Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007)
- Watson v. State, 975 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- Ward v. State, 19 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)
- Eugenia Austin v. State, 968 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Smith v. State, 988 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Williams v. State, 24 So. 3d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Samson Lee Gamble v. State, 996 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)