CORY B. HOWARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Howard challenged a trial court's denial of his motion for additional jail credit, claiming he was owed 148 days of credit for time served on house arrest beyond the 28 days awarded. The appellate court reversed, holding that a mere stipulation to a specific amount of credit is insufficient to constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of additional credit without evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement and voluntarily relinquished it.
A stipulation to a specific amount of credit is not sufficient to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of credit to which a defendant would otherwise be entitled absent evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that right. The case is remanded for the circuit court to determine whether the record demonstrates the defendant's right to the requested credit.
[1] A defendant's agreement to a specific amount of jail credit during plea colloquy does not conclusively waive entitlement to additional credit without evidence that the de…
[2] A written plea agreement stating a defendant agrees to waive a specific amount of jail credit may satisfy the requirement that the defendant knew of their entitlement to…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A stipulation as to a specific amount of credit is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived credit to which he otherwise would be entitled "in the absence of evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that right."”
Establishes the legal standard for what constitutes a valid waiver of jail credit—mere stipulation is insufficient without evidence of knowledge and voluntary relinquishment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHoward's trial court awarded him 28 days of jail credit. Howard moved for an additional 148 days of credit, alleging he had served that time on house …
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The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion seeking additional jail credit under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.800(a). We reverse and remand for the circuit court to determine if the record demonstrates the defendant’s right to the requested credit.
The defendant’s motion alleged that the trial court awarded him 28 days of credit, but that he was still due 148 days of credit which he served on house arrest. The defendant further alleged that his court and jail records would conclusively demonstrate his entitlement to that credit. The state’s response argued that the plea transcript conclusively refuted the defendant’s motion. According to the state, the transcript showed that the defendant expressly acknowledged his agreement to 28 days of credit.
The circuit court entered an order denying the defendant’s motion, reasoning that • the plea transcript conclusively refuted the defendant’s motion. According to the court, “[t]he record reflects that Defendant was fully advised by the Court of his sentence, agreed to credit for 28 days, and thereby waived any additional credit.” (emphasis added).
We reverse. A stipulation as to a specific amount of credit is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived credit to which he otherwise would be entitled “in the absence of evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that right.” Velasquez v. State, 11 So.3d 979, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted); cf. Lahens v. State, 27 So.3d 174, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (finding Velasquez to be distinguishable where written plea agreement, stating that the defendant agreed to waive a full year of credit, satisfies the requirement that a defendant “knew of his entitlement” to additional jail credit and voluntarily waived his right to that credit).
Neither the circuit court in its order, nor the state in this appeal, has cited any evidence in the record that the defendant knew of his alleged entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that right. Therefore, we remand for the circuit court to determine if the record demonstrates the defendant’s right to the requested credit and to rule accordingly. Velasquez, 11 So.3d at 980.
Reversed and remanded.
TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011)…urs in result. . While not the basis of this Court's jurisdiction, certain other decisions have — like Davis — treated challenges to credit-for-time-served provisions of plea agreements as cognizable under rule 3.800(a). See, e.g., Howard v. State, 40 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Rudicil v. State, 31 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Reddix v. State, 15 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Velasquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Giggetts v. State, 5 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Silverstein v. S…
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Villar v. State, 110 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…herefore affirm without prejudice for appellant to file a Rule 3.850 motion in the trial court within sixty days of the mandate for this opinion. Affirmed. STEVENSON, TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . The overruled cases include: Howard v. State, 40 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Rudicil v. State, 31 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Velasquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Giggetts v. State, 5 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Silverstein v. State, 654 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).…
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Allen v. State, 57 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ach the referenced plea sheet to the order of denial. And, even if the plea sheet had been attached, it would have been insufficient to establish Allen knowingly and intelligently waived his entitlement to the additional credit. See Howard v. State, 40 So. 3d 46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“A stipulation as to a specific amount of credit is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived credit to which he otherwise would be entitled ‘in the absence of evidence that the defend…
Authorities Cited
- Delmar Velasquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Lahens v. State, 27 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)