QUENTIN LAMAR JOYNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Quentin Lamar Joyner appeals his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the trial court's jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter constituted fundamental error requiring reversal. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, distinguishing the case from State v. Montgomery and finding no fundamental error because Joyner was convicted as charged and his counsel had specifically agreed to the instruction.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instruction was not fundamental error because: (1) Joyner was convicted as charged rather than for a lesser included offense; (2) the manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction provided an option that did not require intent to kill, preventing the instruction from tainting the fairness of the proceeding; and (3) defense counsel's agreement to the instruction at the charging conference distinguished the case from Montgomery.
[1] An erroneous jury instruction on a lesser included offense does not constitute fundamental error requiring reversal of a conviction for the charged offense when the jury…
[2] The fundamental error doctrine is reserved for rare cases involving jurisdictional error or compelling interests of justice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fundamental error doctrine is to be applied 'only in the rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application.'”
Establishes the strict standard for applying fundamental error, which requires either jurisdictional error or compelling interests of justice
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoyner was charged with and convicted of second-degree murder. At trial, the jury received standard instructions on lesser included offenses, includin…
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Quentin Lamar Joyner challenges his conviction for second-degree murder as charged. Appellant argues that the trial court’s use of the standard jury instruction for the lesser included offense of manslaughter by act constituted fundamental error and requires reversal of his conviction of the charged offense. He relies on State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla. 2010), approving Montgomery v. State, — So.3d-(Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
This case is distinguishable from State v. Moritgomery because Joyner was convicted as charged, rather than for one of the lesser included offenses.
In addition, the jury instructions given in this case included an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence. As was the case in Salonko v. State, — So.3d - (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence gave the jury to option of finding the appellant guilty of a lesser included offense which did not require an intent to kill. Accordingly, the erroneous manslaughter instruction here “did not inter*307fere with the jury’s deliberative process in a way that tainted the underlying fairness of the entire proceeding” and was thus not fundamental error. Salonko v. State, 42 So.3d 801, 803.
The fundamental error doctrine is to be applied “only in the rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application.” Nesbitt v. State, 889 So.2d 801, 803 (Fla. 2004): Martinez v. State, 981 So.2d 449, 455 (Fla.2008). To determine whether an instruction error “vitiated the ‘validity of the trial,’ courts conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Croom v. State, 36 So.3d 707, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038, 1043 (Fla.2008)). Appellate courts are constrained to exercise their discretion concerning fundamental error “very guardedly” and “only in rare cases.” Fike v. State, 4 So.3d 734, 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
Finally, this case can be distinguished from Montgomery because the defense not only failed to object to the standard jury instruction on manslaughter, he specifically agreed to that instruction at the charging conference and incorporated the instruction into his closing argument to the jury. This court’s recent opinion in Calloway v. State, 37 So.3d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) recognized that where defense counsel agrees to a standard jury instruction and then challenges the conviction based upon fundamental error in that instruction, reversal would have the unintended consequence of encouraging defense counsel to “stand mute and, if necessary, agree to an erroneous instruction” or sacrifice his client’s opportunity for a second trial. Encouraging counsel to invite such error subverts the trial process and is counter to the interests of justice.
Because this case is distinguishable from Montgomery, and because the totality of the circumstances does not establish the rare situation where the erroneous standard instruction vitiated the validity of the entire trial proceedings on the charge of second degree murder, the conviction is AFFIRMED.
HAWKES, C.J., and VAN NORTWICK, J., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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Riesel v. State, 48 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had premeditated intent to cause death, only an intent to commit and (sic) act which caused death.”1 The jury was not instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence. Cf. Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Salonko v. State, 42 So. 3d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The manslaughter instruction in the present case is not materially different from the instruction held to be fundamental error in State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla.2010…
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Moore v. State, 114 So. 3d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…onstrained by Lucas to find that the failure to instruct on justifiable or excusable homicide is not subject to a harmless-error analysis, even where there was no dispute as to that issue. Lucas, 645 So. 2d at 427. Most recently in Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), this court relied on Calloway to find a Montgomery error was waived. The defendant argued the trial court’s use of the standard jury instruction on manslaughter was fundamental error pursuant to Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252, becaus…
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Daniels v. State, 72 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…the conviction based upon fundamental error in that instruction,” reversing the conviction may “have the unintended consequence of encouraging defense counsel to ‘stand mute and, if necessary, agree to an erroneous instruction[.]’ ” Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Calloway v. State, 37 So. 3d 891, 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). However, we do not believe that counsel’s acquiescence, silence, or argument in favor of the challenged instruction here constitutes waiver or invited erro…
Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010)
- Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2008)
- Zamir Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 2008)
- Salonko v. State, 42 So. 3d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Croom v. State, 36 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Marcellus Desmond Calloway v. State, 37 So. 3d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Nesbitt v. State, 889 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 2004)
- Lynwood Davis v. State, 4 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Fike v. State, 4 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)