MICHAEL SAMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-07-23
No. 1D10-1057
Thomas, J., Roberts, J., Marstiller, J.
41 So. 3d 366 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

The court reversed the reclassification of an aggravated battery conviction from second to first-degree felony because the record did not establish that the enhancement was based on great bodily harm rather than the use of a weapon, which is an essential element of the offense.


Holding

A conviction for aggravated battery cannot be reclassified to a higher felony degree based solely on use of a weapon when use of a weapon is an essential element of the charge.


Headnotes

[1] When an aggravated battery conviction rests on use of a weapon as an essential element, the conviction cannot be reclassified to a higher felony degree based on that same…

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Key Quotes

“If an aggravated battery conviction arises merely from the use of a weapon, and not because of great bodily harm, reclassification is prohibited, as use of a weapon is an essential element of the charge.”

Court explaining the legal standard for when weapon-based enhancement is prohibited in aggravated battery cases.

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was convicted of aggravated battery and his sentence was enhanced from a second-degree to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant asserts that his aggravated battery conviction was improperly reclassified from a second to a first-degree felony based on the use of a weapon, because use of a weapon is an essential element of aggravated battery.

If an aggravated battery conviction arises merely from the use of a weapon, and not because of great bodily harm, reclassification is prohibited, as use of a weapon is an essential element of the charge. See Thomas v. State, 932 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Perry v. State, 858 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Where it is unclear whether the defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery based on great bodily harm or the use of a *367deadly weapon, enhancement is not permitted. See Perry, 858 So.2d at 1272 (citing Montgomery v. State, 704 So.2d 548, 550-51 (Fla. 1st DCA1997)).

Here, the record does not refute Appellant’s claim that his aggravated battery sentence was improperly enhanced. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of Appellant’s first claim and remand for record attachments which conclusively refute Appellant’s claim or to resentence Appellant. The remaining claims are affirmed without further discussion.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

THOMAS, ROBERTS, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Brady v. State, 65 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    …assification is not permitted when a defendant is convicted of aggravated battery where it is not clear whether the defendant was found guilty based on a finding that he caused great bodily harm or that he used a deadly weapon. See Sampson v. State, 41 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). However, the State urges affirmance, alleging that this case “was always about great bodily harm and permanent disfigurement.” We conclude that the case of Montgomery v. State, 704 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), supports the de…
  • Howe v. State, 187 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    …PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of mandamus is denied as premature. See Ritter v. McNeil, 41 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). LEWIS, SWANSON, and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.…

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