SPENCER DENO AND ELIZABETH D. DENO, AS CO-PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM S. DENO, DECEASED, APPELLANTS,
v.
LIFEMARK HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA, INC., D/B/A PALMETTO GENERAL HOSPITAL, ABDUL-RAHMAN JARAKI, M.D., AND JARAKI MEDICAL CARE, P.A., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 2010-10-13
No. 3D09-984
Before COPE, WELLS and SALTER, JJ.
45 So. 3d 959 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Estate of William S. Deno appealed an arbitration award in a medical malpractice case, arguing that the $250,000 statutory cap on non-economic damages should apply per defendant rather than per incident. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the arbitration panel's interpretation that the cap applies per claimant per incident, not per defendant.


Holding

The court held that the $250,000 cap on non-economic damages under section 766.207(7)(b) applies per claimant per incident, not per defendant. Therefore, the total non-economic damages award of $750,000 to three claimants was correctly calculated under the statute.


Headnotes

[1] Voluntary binding arbitration of medical negligence claims under section 766.207, Florida Statutes, requires admission of liability, with the sole issue being damages.

[2] In voluntary binding arbitration of medical negligence claims, defendants are jointly and severally liable for all assessed damages.

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Key Quotes

“Non-economic damages shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000 per incident.”

The statutory cap language at issue in the case, which forms the basis for the dispute about the proper calculation method.

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Facts & Procedural History

William S. Deno died following a heart procedure performed by Dr. Jaraki at Lifemark Hospital. The Estate, as personal representatives, filed a medica…

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, J.

COPE, J.

This is an appeal of an arbitration award in a medical negligence case. The question is how to interpret section 766.207, Florida Statutes (2008), which provides for voluntary binding arbitration of medical negligence claims. We conclude that the *960arbitration panel correctly interpreted the statute.

Spencer Deno and Elizabeth D. Deno, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of William S. Deno (“the Estate”), filed a notice of intent which alleged medical malpractice by Lifemark Hospital of Florida, Inc. (doing business as Palmetto General Hospital), Doctor Abdul-Rahman Jaraki, and Jaraki Medical Care, P.A. The claim was negligence in the performance of a heart procedure on William S. Deno, following which he died.

Lifemark made an offer to arbitrate under section 766.207. Dr. Jaraki and Jaraki Medical Care, P.A., made a separate offer to arbitrate. The Estate accepted the offers and the two arbitration proceedings were consolidated.

In a proceeding under section 766.207, the liability of the defendants is admitted. The only issue is damages. Those are set by a panel of three arbitrators, one selected by the claimant, one selected by the defendant, and an administrative law judge designated by the Division of Administrative Hearings who serves as the chief arbitrator. Id. § 766.207(4). Defendants who submit to arbitration under section 766.207 are jointly and severally liable for all damages assessed. Id. § 766.207(7)(h).

The issue before us is how to calculate the statutory limitation on non-economic damages. The statute provides that “[n]on-economic damages shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000 per incident....” Id. § 766.207(7)(b). This has been interpreted to mean $250,000 per claimant per incident. St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 972 (Fla.2000). The arbitration panel awarded $250,000 in non-economic damages to three claimants, Elizabeth D. Deno, Demi Deno, and William Deno, for a total award of non-economic damages of $750,000.

The Estate argued that the award is too low. The Estate contended that the statute allows a $250,000 non-economic damage award per claimant per defendant. In this case there were two defendants: Life-mark and Dr. Jaraki.1 According to the Estate, there should be a $750,000 non-economic damage award against Lifemark and a separate $750,000 non-economic damage award against Dr. Jaraki, for a total of $1.5 million. The arbitration panel rejected the Estate’s “per defendant” argument.

Under the voluntary binding arbitration statute, once the arbitration panel makes its damage award, the award may be appealed to the District Court of Appeal. § 766.212(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Estate has appealed.

We agree with the arbitration panel. Under the statute, the arbitration panel awards both economic damages and non-economic damages. Id. § 766.207(7)(a), (b). Non-economic damages are capped at $250,000 per incident and, as already stated, this has been interpreted to mean $250,000 per claimant per incident. The text of the statute says nothing of a “per defendant” calculation.

Under St. Mary’s, the idea is that each claimant may recover up to $250,000 of non-economic damages per malpractice incident. Under the Estate’s position; the amount of non-economic damages would fluctuate, depending on the number of defendants in the case. That is inconsistent with the idea of a uniform cap. The arbitration panel’s ruling is consistent with the *961text of the statute and the statutory scheme.

The Estate argues alternatively that the arbitration panel’s ruling renders the statute unconstitutional. We fail to see any constitutional infirmity. See Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So.2d 189 (Fla.1993).

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …o grant a certain award ‘is very limited, with a high degree of conclusiveness attaching to an arbitration award.’” (quoting Charbonneau v. Morse Operations, Inc., 727 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))); Deno v. Lifemark Hosp. of Florida, Inc., 45 So. 3d 959, 960–61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The arbitration panel’s ruling is consistent with the text of the statute and the statutory scheme.”); Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 778 (Fla. 1954) (“The pecuniary value of services which the husband might reasona…
  • …panel of three arbitrators, one selected by the claimant, one selected by the defendant, and an administrative law judge designated by the Division of Administrative Hearings who serves as the chief arbitrator.” Deno v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 45 So. 3d 959, 960 (Fla. 3d DCA2010). . At oral argument, counsel for Mercy Hospital argued that it was not true that the testimony below was undisputed that a recurrence would be fatal to Estrada. A review of the medical experts’ testimony reveals that indeed,…
  • Meridian Pain & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Greber, 197 So. 3d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …ohnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987). Certiorari jurisdiction may lie, however, when chapter 766 presuit requirements are at issue. Fassy v. Crowley, 884 So. 2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). .Deno v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 45 So. 3d 959, 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("In a proceeding under section 766.207, the liability of the defendants is admitted. The only [*156] issue is damages. Those are sfet by a panel of three arbitrators....”).…

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