TODD A. HATFIELD, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-11-03
No. 2D09-5938
DAVIS and KHOUZAM, JJ„ Concur.
46 So. 3d 654 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Petitioner Todd Hatfield sought a writ of prohibition to disqualify Circuit Judge Philip Federico from his postconviction proceeding, arguing that the judge's denial of his motion to disqualify was untimely under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j). The court held that the judge's ruling was timely because the five-day mail service extension under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e) applies to disqualification motions, giving the court thirty-five days rather than thirty days to rule.


Holding

The trial court's order denying the motion to disqualify was timely because the five-day mail service extension under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e) applies to motions to disqualify under rule 2.330(j), giving the court thirty-five days rather than thirty days from the date of mailing to rule on the motion. Since the court ruled on the thirty-fifth day, it complied with the applicable deadline.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to disqualify a judge is deemed granted if the judge fails to rule on the motion within thirty days of its service.

[2] A court lacks authority to rule on a postconviction motion after a motion to disqualify the presiding judge has been deemed granted.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The judge shall rule on a motion to disqualify immediately, but no later than 30 days after the service of the motion as set forth in subdivision (c). If not ruled on within 30 days of service, the motion shall be deemed granted and the moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case.”

The applicable rule governing the deadline for ruling on disqualification motions

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Hatfield served his motion to disqualify by mailing it from prison on November 5, 2009, along with a motion for postconviction relief. The trial court…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
CRENSHAW, Judge.

CRENSHAW, Judge.

Petitioner Todd Hatfield seeks a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Philip J. Federico to disqualify him from presiding over Hatfield’s postconviction proceeding. Judge Federico denied Hatfield’s motion to disqualify judge as insufficient on its face. Within his petition for writ of prohibition, Hatfield argues that his motion was legally sufficient and that the trial judge’s order was not timely entered, thereby requiring that the motion to disqualify be deemed granted. We deny the petition for writ of prohibition. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the motion to disqualify was facially insufficient without further discussion. We also conclude that the trial court’s order denying the motion to disqualify was timely entered and we write to explain this conclusion.1

Hatfield served his motion to disqualify by mailing it from prison on November 5, 2009, along with a motion for postconviction relief. The trial court denied the motion on December 10, thirty-five days after service. Hatfield argues that Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(j) requires that the motion must be deemed granted:

The judge shall rule on a motion to disqualify immediately, but no later than 30 days after the service of the motion as set forth in subdivision (c). If not ruled on within 30 days of service, the motion shall be deemed granted and the moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(j).

Although the plain language of the rule would appear to be in Hatfield’s favor, we note first that this provision refers to subdivision (c) of the same rule, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n addition to filing with the clerk, the movant shall immediately serve a copy of the motion on the subject judge as set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.080.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(c)(4). Rule 1.080 provides, in pertinent part, that

[sjervice on the attorney or party shall be made by delivering a copy or mailing it to the attorney or the party at the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Service by mail shall be complete upon mailing.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.080(b).2 We conclude that because rule 2.330(c)(4) invokes the rule of civil procedure governing service of a pleading, related civil rules must also necessarily apply. Cf. Holter v. Dohnansky, 917 So.2d 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (invoking rule 1.090(a) to allow an extra day for *656filing a motion to disqualify when the filing deadline fell on a Sunday). Relevant to the present issue, rule 1.090(e) provides that

[w]hen a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceeding within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon that party and the notice or paper is served upon that party by mail, 5 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(e).3

As such, because Hatfield served his motion by mail, the circuit court had five additional days to rule on Hatfield’s motion to disqualify, or a total of thirty-five days from the date of mailing. Because the court ruled on the motion on the thirty-fifth day, the ruling was timely under rule 2.330(j), and Hatfield’s petition for writ of prohibition must be denied.

Petition denied.

DAVIS and KHOUZAM, JJ„ Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • McCRAY v. State, 151 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …bed period.” See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(e) (2012); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.070 (2012); Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(e) (2012). Under the former rules, five days would have been added to the 30 day period prescribed by rule 2.330(j). See Hatfield v. State, 46 So. 3d 654, 655 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that rule allowing additional time after service by mail extended time for judge to rule on motion to disqualify, and specifically: “That the judge is not a party to the underlying proceeding does not affect the…
  • Curry v. State, 128 So. 3d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
    …PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of prohibition is denied. See Hatfield v. State, 46 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). PADOVANO, ROWE, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw