ERLING HENRICK JONSSON, HUSBAND, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA M. DICKINSON, WIFE, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-02-12
No. 1D09-5311
WOLF, WEBSTER, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
46 So. 3d 1016 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A former husband appealed portions of a final judgment dissolving his marriage, challenging a $30,000 award to his former wife and other issues. The appellate court affirmed all aspects of the trial court's judgment, finding the award was proper as reimbursement for premarital funds the wife lost when the marital home was foreclosed due to the husband's failure to pay the mortgage.


Holding

The $30,000 award was proper and amply supported by the record as an equitable reimbursement rather than lump sum alimony. The former husband's other challenges were not preserved for appeal because he abandoned his motion for rehearing by filing his notice of appeal before the trial court ruled on the motion, and the other issues were either not presented in a motion for rehearing or were abandoned in the same manner.


Headnotes

[1] An award intended to reimburse a spouse for premarital funds invested in a marital home, lost due to foreclosure resulting from the other spouse's failure to pay the mort…

[2] A complaint that a trial court failed to make required findings of fact is unpreserved if not raised in a motion for rehearing.

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Key Quotes

“it is apparent that the award was intended as an equitable award to reimburse the former wife for $30,000 of premarital funds she had invested in the marital home, which investment she lost when the home was foreclosed upon because the former husband did not pay the mortgage while the dissolution litigation was pending as he had been ordered to do.”

Establishes the proper characterization of the $30,000 award as equitable reimbursement rather than lump sum alimony and explains the factual basis for the award.

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties were dissolving their marriage. The former wife had invested $30,000 of her premarital funds in the marital home. The former husband faile…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The former husband seeks review of portions of the final judgment dissolving the marriage between him and the former wife. We affirm as to all issues.

The former husband complains first about a provision directing him to pay $30,000 to the former wife. The trial court characterized this award as “lump sum alimony.” However, it is apparent that the award was intended as an equitable award to reimburse the former wife for $30,000 of premarital funds she had invested in the marital home, which investment she lost when the home was foreclosed upon because the former husband did not pay the mortgage while the dissolution litigation was pending as he had been ordered to do. As such, the award is amply supported by the record. To the extent that, as a part of this issue, the former husband complains that the trial court failed to make findings of fact as required by statute, he has not preserved the point because, although he filed a motion for rehearing, he abandoned it when he filed his notice of appeal before the trial court had ruled on the motion. See Owens v. Owens, 973 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (treating a complaint that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact as unpreserved because it was not *1017raised by a motion for rehearing); Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h)(3) (stating that, if a notice of appeal is filed before an order is entered disposing of a timely filed motion for rehearing, the motion will be deemed abandoned). The other two issues raised by the former husband are, likewise, not preserved because either not presented in a motion for rehearing or, if presented, abandoned when he filed his notice of appeal before the trial court ruled on the motion.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, WEBSTER, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …judgment of injunction for domestic violence, this issue was not preserved for appellate review, in that Mr. Achurra never brought this matter to the trial court to afford a reasonable opportunity to correct the deficiency. See Jonsson v. Dickinson, 46 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Mize v. Mize, 45 So. 3d 49, 49 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). However, we can consider for the first time on appeal the “insufficiency of the evidence” issue. See Fla. R. Civ. P.…
  • GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 111 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …contrary, when a party makes an argument in a motion for rehearing, and that motion is later abandoned by filing a notice of appeal prior to obtaining a ruling on said motion, the arguments therein are not preserved for appeal. Jonsson v. Dickinson, 46 So. 3d 1016, 1016-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Krock v. Rozinsky, 78 So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). In Jonsson, the former husband complained on appeal that the trial court failed to make findings of fact as required by statute. Jonsson, 46 So. 3d at 1016. The…
  • Delivorias v. Delivorias, 80 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …e law and the sufficiency of the evidence, the absence of findings was not raised and preserved for appellate review in a motion for rehearing in the trial court and cannot, standing alone, constitute a ground for reversal. See Jonsson v. Dickinson, 46 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Owens v. Owens, 973 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Mathieu v. Mathieu, 877 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).…

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