MARION WALLACE, APPELLANT,
v.
MELBA WALLACE, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2010-10-29
No. 2D09-3042
SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ„ Concur.
46 So. 3d 1118 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Marion Wallace appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial court's income determinations, asset distribution, and attorney's fee award. The appellate court affirmed the dissolution but reversed and remanded the remaining issues because the trial court failed to make adequate statutory findings required in family law cases.


Holding

The court affirmed the dissolution of marriage but reversed and remanded the remaining portions of the judgment because Florida statutory and case law requires that the trial court make specific written findings regarding income determinations, asset and liability valuations with justification for unequal distribution, and attorney's fee awards with detailed calculations.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's determination of a party's income in a dissolution judgment must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.

[2] A final judgment of dissolution that awards alimony must be supported by specific factual findings justifying the award.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The trial court's determination of the amount of a party's income must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.”

Establishes the legal requirement for income determinations in dissolution proceedings

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Marion and Melba Wallace were parties to a divorce proceeding. The trial court dissolved their marriage and made determinations regarding the Wife's i…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
VILLANTI, Judge.

VILLANTI, Judge.

Marion Wallace (the Husband) appeals the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Melba Wallace (the Wife). We affirm the dissolution of marriage but reverse the remainder of the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Husband claims that the trial court committed reversible error by (1) failing to make the requisite findings to support its determination that the Wife’s income was less than that established by the undisputed testimony, (2) distributing the parties’ assets and liabilities unequally without establishing a valuation date and without making specific findings to justify the unequal distribution, and (3) ordering the Husband to pay the Wife’s attorney’s fees without making the requisite findings concerning the reasonable hours expended and the reasonable hourly rate. Because controlling statutory and case law requires *1119that each of these determinations be made by the trial court, we must reverse and remand for such findings. See Lin v. Lin, 37 So.3d 941, 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The trial court’s determination of the amount of a party’s income must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.”); Rogers v. Rogers, 12 So.3d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing an attorney’s fee award and remanding for specific findings supporting the court’s determination of entitlement to fees, the amount of fees awarded, and any payment plan it imposes); McCants v. McCants, 984 So.2d 678, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that a final judgment of dissolution that awards alimony based on a determination of income that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence must be reversed); Pavese v. Pavese, 932 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes, and holding that a final judgment of dissolution that fails to include specific written findings of fact that identify, classify, value, and distribute the parties’ assets and liabilities must be reversed); Pignataro v. Rutledge, 841 So.2d 636, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a final judgment of dissolution must contain specific written findings valuing the parties’ assets and liabilities and justifying any unequal distribution); Walker v. Walker, 818 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court’s failure to make adequate factual findings to explain or support its decision regarding the type and amount of alimony requires reversal for such findings).

It may well be that the result on remand is a change in the composition of the award types and amounts, and therefore the trial court is not bound by its initial determinations on these issues. Further, as freely acknowledged by the Husband at oral argument, remand for additional factual findings may result in a greater alimony award to the Wife in this long-term marriage. This is a risk the Husband has chosen to take. In addition, while the parties have few assets to be distributed between them, controlling authority does not recognize the paucity of assets as an exception to the requirement that the statutorily required findings be included in the final judgment of dissolution. Hence, while we affirm the dissolution of marriage, we must reverse and remand the balance of the judgment for further findings.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ„ Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Perez v. Perez, 100 So. 3d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
    …2d at 700. After considering these factors, the trial court must make specific factual findings — either at the hearing or in the written judgment — supporting its determination of entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees. See Wallace v. Wallace, 46 So. 3d 1118, 1118-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Rogers v. Rogers, 12 So. 3d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Perrin v. Perrin, 795 So. 2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“[A] trial court cannot decide the issue of attorney’s fees without findings as to one spouse’s abil…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw