WALTER A. MCNEIL, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLANT,
v.
KERN DAVIS, APPELLEE
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The court reversed the trial court's sua sponte transfer of a mandamus petition challenging a prison disciplinary action from Leon County to Columbia County, holding that venue was proper in Leon County where the Department of Corrections is headquartered.
Venue for a mandamus petition challenging a prison disciplinary action is proper in Leon County where the Department of Corrections is headquartered, not in the county where the inmate is incarcerated.
[1] Venue for a mandamus petition challenging a prison disciplinary action lies in the county where the agency being petitioned is headquartered, not in the county where the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis filed a petition for writ of mandamus raising six claims: four related to a disciplinary report and two related to placement in close management…
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Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s sua sponte order transferring Davis’ petition for writ of mandamus to the circuit court in Columbia County where Davis is currently incarcerated. Appellant contends that venue was proper in Leon County because the petition challenges a prison disciplinary action. Davis concedes that the trial court erred in transferring the petition. We reverse.
In his petition, Davis raised six claims, four of which related to a disciplinary report, and two of which related to his placement in close management supervision and loss of visitation. Davis notes that the claims relating to his placement in close management and loss of visitation are moot, and had become moot prior the trial court’s transfer order, and he concedes that the proper venue for his remaining claims related to the disciplinary report is in Leon County where the Department of Corrections is headquartered. See Bush v. State, 945 So.2d 1207, 1213-14 (Fla. 2006). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order transferring Davis’ petition for writ of mandamus and remand for consideration of the claims in the petition related to the disciplinary report.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
WOLF, ROBERTS and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
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McNEIL v. Bailey, 50 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…action. Because the purpose of Appellee’s petition was to challenge four disciplinary reports, venue was proper in Leon County where the Department of Corrections is headquartered. Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1213-14 (Fla.2006), McNeil v. Davis, 46 So. 3d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). To the extent that Appellee’s petition could be construed as challenging his close management status, this claim is moot as Appellee has been transferred back to the general population. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Corbblin Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 2006)