PETER SOTOLONGO AND PETER SOTOLONGO, P.A., APPELLANTS,
v.
CELEBRITY CRUISES, LTD., APPELLEE
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The court affirmed a contempt finding against Sotolongo for violating a fee-sharing agreement in 77 cases but reversed the disqualification order as applied to cases without such agreements.
A trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Sotolongo in contempt for violating a court order regarding fee-sharing agreements in 77 cases, but abused its discretion in disqualifying him from representing clients against cruise lines in unrelated cases.
[1] A trial court may disqualify an attorney from representing clients against a party only in cases where evidence demonstrates misconduct related to that party, not in all…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A court may hold a person or party in direct criminal contempt for the violation of a court order or for an act that is contemptuous on its face.”
Citing Carnival Corp. v. Beverly for the standard governing contempt findings.
Sotolongo, an attorney, entered into fee-sharing agreements in 77 cases involving cruise line defendants. The trial court found him in contempt for vi…
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Peter Sotolongo and Peter Sotolongo, P.A. (collectively, “Sotolongo”) appeal from an order finding Sotolongo in contempt of court. Based upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Sotolongo in contempt of court in the seventy-seven cases to which the fee-sharing agreements applied. See Carnival Corp. v. Beverly, 744 So.2d 489, 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“A court may hold a person or party in direct criminal contempt for the violation of a court order or for an act that is contemptuous on its face.”); Henriquez v. Temple, 668 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
However, because there is no evidence or finding of any misconduct in the cases to which the fee-sharing agreements do not apply, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying Soto-longo from representing clients against Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. and Celebrity Cruises, Ltd. (“RCL”) in those cases. Accordingly, we remand with directions for the trial court to enter an order clarifying that the contempt order applies only to the original seventy-seven cases, and that So-tolongo is not disqualified from representing clients against RCL in cases to which the fee-sharing agreements did not apply. With that exception, we otherwise affirm the contempt order and the sanctions of repayment of fees and disqualification as it applies to the original seventy-seven cases.
Affirmed as modified.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Carnival Corp. v. Beverly, 744 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Henriquez v. Richard Temple, 668 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)