ANTHONY RAY CASEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a trial court's mistaken belief that it was mandatory to impose a previously suspended sentence requires reversal.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by imposing a sentence based on the mistaken belief that it is mandatory to impose a previously suspended sentence.
[2] Upon revocation of probation, a trial court retains discretion to impose a sentence less than the original suspended sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnthony Ray Casey pleaded guilty to grand theft and received a suspended sentence and probation. He admitted to violating probation, and the trial cou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Anthony Ray Casey appeals an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to a previously suspended term of five years in prison. Casey was originally charged with and entered a plea to grand theft and was sentenced to five years in prison, suspended, and five years of probation. He thereafter admitted violating his probation and was given the suspended sentence. Casey argues, and the State correctly concedes, that his sentence must be reversed because the trial court mistakenly believed that it was required to impose the suspended portion of his sentence.
At the original sentencing hearing for grand theft, the trial court told Casey that if he violated the terms of his probation, “you’re going to get five years Florida State Prison because I’ve suspended it.... Because I’ve suspended it, so I won’t have any discretion. Unless the State agrees, I’ve pretty much bound my hands.” Thereafter, before accepting Casey’s admission to the violation of probation, the trial court stated as follows:
Is it your intention to admit your violation of probation today with the understanding that this is an open plea; I can sentence you to any lawful sentence, up to five years in prison — I believe, actually, you have five years in prison suspended, so there’s not a lot of mystery about what’s going to happen here, I don’t think.
Here, as in Nadzo v. State, 24 So.3d 690, 691-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court was under the mistaken belief that it was mandatory to impose the previously suspended prison term. In Nadzo, 24 So.3d at 692, this court noted that the trial court could have continued, modified, or revoked the appellant’s probation and that, after deciding to revoke the probation, the trial court could impose a sentence less than *783the original sentence. See also Cowart v. State, 860 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Lacey v. State, 831 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Because the trial court appears to have believed it was required to sentence Casey to five years in prison, we reverse and remand the case for reconsideration.
CASANUEVA, C.J., and BLACK, J„ Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Harvey v. State, 156 So. 3d 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…tic sentence” in the sense that the trial court is required to impose the suspended sentence in the event of a violation. Instead, the court retains the discretion and authority to impose any sentence it could otherwise have imposed. Casey v. State, 50 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Nadzo v. State, 24 So. 3d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Cowart v. State, 860 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Lacey, 831 So. 2d at 1270; Griffin v. State, 783 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). We make no determination as to the propriet…
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Lawrence v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)…d because the above statement indicates that the trial court may not have understood its discretion under section 948.06(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (2023), to "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed." See Casey v. State, 50 So. 3d 782, 782–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that reconsideration of the appellant's sentences was warranted where the trial court "appear[ed] to have believed" that it had no discretion to impose a sentence other than the suspended prison term upon [the…
Authorities Cited
- Rahmah Jakouch v. State, 831 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Cowart v. State, 860 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Nadzo v. State, 24 So. 3d 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)