FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND SCOTT RUBIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
JASON LINDSEY, APPELLEE
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Florida Atlantic University and Scott Rubin appealed a summary judgment ruling that granted sovereign immunity to Jason Lindsey, the wrestling club president, on grounds that he was an FAU agent. The court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether an agency relationship existed between FAU and Lindsey that should be resolved by a jury.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether an agency relationship existed between FAU and Lindsey. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the record did not conclusively establish that Lindsey was an FAU agent as a matter of law.
[1] Summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding an agency relationship.
[2] An officer, employee, or agent of the state is not personally liable in tort for acts within the scope of employment unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpos…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court is not called upon to determine whether the plaintiff can actually prove his cause of action. Rather, the court's function is solely to determine whether the record conclusively shows that the moving party proved a negative, that is, "the nonexistence of a genuine issue of a material fact."”
Establishes the proper standard for evaluating summary judgment motions and the court's limited role in determining whether material facts exist
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScott Rubin was injured during an FAU wrestling club practice on campus. Rubin sued both FAU and Jason Lindsey, the wrestling club's president, allegi…
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Scott Rubin sued Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees (FAU) for injuries he sustained in a wrestling accident while participating in an FAU wrestling club practice on campus.
In addition to FAU, Rubin also sued FAU’s wrestling club’s president, Jason Lindsey, alleging he was negligent in failing to inspect the equipment and correct a dangerous condition in the gymnasium where the practice took place, and negligently maintained the equipment by made-*1206quately taping or fastening the wrestling mats together. Rubin alleged the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of his injuries.
After much discovery, Lindsey moved for summary judgment, asserting he was an agent of FAU and that the claim against him was barred by section 768.28(9)(a) 1 Florida Statutes (2008). Lindsey contended that as an agent of FAU, he was entitled to the sovereign immunity exemption of an employee or agent of the state university. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, determining there were no material issues of fact that would dispute that Lindsey was an agent of FAU and, therefore, could not be a named party and was entitled to immunity. FAU and Rubin both assert that the trial court erred and that there are genuine material issues of fact that are in dispute, thereby precluding summary judgment. We agree and reverse.
“The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.” Bender v. CareGivers of Am., Inc., 42 So.3d 893, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, P.A., 915 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). Summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court is not called upon to determine whether the plaintiff can actually prove his cause of action. Rather, the court’s function is solely to determine whether the record conclusively shows that the moving party proved a negative, that is, “the nonexistence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” If the record reflects even the possibility of a material issue of fact, or if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the facts, the doubt must be resolved against the moving party.
Bender, 42 So.3d at 894 (quoting Winston Park, Ltd. v. City of Coconut Creek, 872 So.2d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).
Our review of the record reveals that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether an agency relationship existed between FAU and Lindsey that should be resolved by the trier of fact. We, therefore, reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of Lindsey and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and Remanded for FuHher Proceedings.
STEVENSON and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
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Tilus v. AS Michai LLC, 161 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…. We reverse because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the plaintiff had standing at the inception of the lawsuit. The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Lindsey, 50 So. 3d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The plaintiff must prove that it had standing to foreclose at the time the lawsuit was filed. McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). We clarify, however, [*1286] that under the…
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McCABE v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 68 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…cifically covered by the releases entered into by Plaintiffs “subrogees.” Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied. This appeal followed. Orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Lindsey, 50 So. 3d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). A summary judgment can be affirmed only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (F…
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Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Michel Camillo and Jean-Paul Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ing that insurance coverage existed under the Progressive policy for the accident that occurred on July 26, 2008. This appeal followed. The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Lindsey, 50 So. 3d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allenby & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown St. Vincent Ltd., 8 So. 3d 1211, 1213 (Fla…
Previewing 3 of 25 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shawanni Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, P.A., 915 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Winston Park, Ltd. v. City OF Coconut Creek, 872 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Bender v. Caregivers OF Am., Inc., 42 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)