ALICIA ARCE, APPELLANT,
v.
RAYMOND A. HAAS, INDIVIDUALLY; RAYMOND A. HAAS, P.A.; HAAS, DUTTON, BLACKBURN, LEWIS & LONGLEY, P.A.; GEORGE A. YAKA, INDIVIDUALLY; AND VAKA, LARSON & JOHNSON, P.L., APPELLEES
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Alicia Arce appealed a summary judgment dismissing her legal malpractice claim against her former defense counsel, Raymond Haas. The appellate court reversed, finding disputed issues of material fact regarding a settlement agreement and the timing of events that precluded summary judgment, and noted the trial court had applied an improper legal standard.
Summary judgment was improper because disputed issues of material fact existed concerning the scope of the alleged settlement agreement and the timing of events, which the trial court was not permitted to resolve. Additionally, the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by considering the weight of evidence rather than focusing on whether disputed material facts existed.
[1] A movant is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials admissible in evidence sho…
[2] When considering a motion for summary judgment, a trial court may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve disputed issues of fact.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve disputed issues of fact.”
Establishes the fundamental rule that summary judgment courts cannot resolve factual disputes, which the trial court violated here.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArce was defendant in a personal injury action brought by Joy Beaufort following an automobile accident. Haas, retained by Arce's insurance carrier GE…
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Alicia Arce appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Raymond A. Haas; Raymond A. Haas, P.A.; and Haas, Dutton, Blackburn, Lewis & Long-ley, P.A. (collectively “Haas”), in Arce’s action against them for legal malpractice. The alleged malpractice arose in the context of an action for personal injuries brought against Arce by one Joy Beaufort following an automobile accident. Haas was retained by Arce’s automobile insurance carrier, GEICO, to defend Arce in the personal injury action.
After a stipulated judgment was entered in favor of Beaufort and against Arce for $450,000, Arce brought this legal malpractice action against Haas based on events surrounding the negotiation and implementation of an alleged settlement agreement between Beaufort and Arce. After minimal discovery, the trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of Haas, finding that “the facts clearly and unequivocally convince this Court that legal malpractice was not committed.” Arce then brought this appeal from the final summary judgment.
“A movant is entitled to summary judgment ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Estate of Githens ex rel. Seaman v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So.2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)); see also Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980 So.2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve disputed issues of fact. See Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So.2d 299, 302 (Fla.1957); Williams v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Flagler Cnty., 61 So.2d 493, 493 (Fla.1952); Strickland v. Strickland, 456 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Instead, if the record reflects any disputed issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment must be denied.
Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal in this case and having considered the well-presented arguments made at oral argument, we agree with Arce that there are disputed issues of material fact concerning the scope of the alleged settlement agreement between Arce and Beaufort and the timing of certain events leading up to the entry of the judgment against Arce. The trial court was not permitted to resolve these disputed issues or weigh the evidence to determine whether legal malpractice was committed. And these disputed issues of material fact precluded entry of final summary judgment in favor of Haas.
We also note that it appears that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when considering Haas’s motion. In its order granting summary judgment, the court stated that the facts “clearly and unequivocally convince this Court” that le*532gal malpractice had not occurred. However, the trial court’s opinion of the weight of the evidence and its speculation as to the case’s ultimate outcome are immaterial at the summary judgment stage. See Bishop v. City of Clearwater, 258 So.2d 337, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) (noting that the trial court’s consideration of a motion for summary judgment “ ‘may not be influenced by the chances of success which [the court] considers either party may have on the trial’ ” (quoting Benson v. Atwood, 177 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965))). Instead, the court’s focus must be limited to whether disputed issues of material fact exist and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law, not as a matter of fact. Thus, even if the record had not reflected disputed issues of material fact, we would have been compelled to reverse the final summary judgment and remand for the trial court to reconsider Haas’s motion in light of the proper legal standard.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
ALTENBERND and DAVIS, JJ„ Concur.
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Howell v. Pasco Cnty. & Outlaw Pasco Cnty. & Outlaw, 165 So. 3d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…prehensive Plan. Consequently, there was a disputed issue of material fact that could be resolved only by weighing the credibility of the experts and their opinions— something that is not permitted in a summary judgment proceeding. See Arce v. Haas, 51 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); see also Cummins v. Allstate Indem. Co., 732 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“If the affidavits and other evidence raise any doubt as to any issue of material faet[,] then a summary judgment may not be entered”). Furth…
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Authorities Cited
- Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956)
- The Est. OF Naomi Githens v. BON Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Williams v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 61 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1952)
- Cornell Benson v. Atwood, 177 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Bermont Lakes, LLC v. Rooney, 980 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Strickland v. Strickland, 456 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Helyn Bishop v. City OF Clearwater, 258 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)