MICAH LYNN LAWSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2011-02-04
No. 2D09-2283
KHOUZAM and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
51 So. 3d 1287 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2011) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

The court held that the prosecution for lewd or lascivious battery and abuse of an elderly person was barred by the statute of limitations, requiring vacation of those judgments and sentences.


Headnotes

[1] Prosecution for lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person is barred when the information is filed after the three-year statute of limitations has run, unless an e…

[2] The statute of limitations for prosecution of lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person is three years.

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Facts & Procedural History

Defendant was convicted of burglary, lewd or lascivious battery, and abuse of an elderly person stemming from an incident in 2003. DNA evidence later …

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Opinion of the Court
WALLACE, Judge.

WALLACE, Judge.

Micah Lynn Lawson appeals his judgment and sentences for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, lewd or *1288lascivious battery against an elderly person, and abuse of an elderly person. Mr. Lawson argues, and the State concedes, that his prosecution on the charges of lewd or lascivious battery and elder abuse is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For this reason, we vacate the judgment and sentences on these two charges. Mr. Lawson’s three other arguments are without merit and do not warrant discussion. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment and sentence on the burglary charge.

I. THE FACTS

On the evening of January 26, 2003, a young man broke into the home of a seventy-six-year-old woman in Lee County. The intruder committed a sexual assault on the elderly resident. The identity of the woman’s assailant remained undetermined for several years.

In November 2008, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement notified the Lee County Sheriffs Office that DNA evidence obtained from the victim’s person matched Mr. Lawson’s DNA. On November 20, 2008, the State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit filed an information charging Mr. Lawson with three crimes arising out of the incident: count one, burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery in violation of section 810.02(2), Florida Statutes (2002), a first-degree felony punishable by life; count two, lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person in violation of section 825.1025(2), Florida Statutes (2002), a second-degree felony; and count three, abuse of an elderly person in violation of section 825.102(1), a third-degree felony.

A jury found Mr. Lawson guilty as charged on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Mr. Lawson to sixty-five years’ imprisonment for the burglary charge, fifteen years’ imprisonment for the lewd or lascivious battery, and five years’ imprisonment for the elder abuse. The sentences were designated to run concurrently. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Lawson correctly argues that the statute of limitations had run on the crimes charged in counts two and three before the information was filed. In count two, the State charged Mr. Lawson with lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person under section 825.1025(2). The applicable statute of limitations for prosecution of that crime is three years, and the limitations period ran on January 25, 2006. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because the information in this case was not filed until November 20, 2008, the State did not commence prosecution for the offense until after the limitations period had run. See § 775.15(5)(b) (providing that commencement of prosecution depends, in part, on the filing of an information).

In addition, we agree with Mr. Lawson’s argument that the limitations period applicable to the lewd or lascivious battery charge was not extended under section 775.15(15)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2008), based upon the commencement of the prosecution within one year of Mr. Lawson’s identification through DNA analysis. Section 775.15(15)(a)(2) does not apply to offenses that were barred from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006. § 775.15(15)(b). Similarly, the limitations period was not extended under section 775.15(16)(a)(4) based upon Mr. Lawson’s identification through DNA analysis. Section 775.15(16)(a)(4) does not apply to offenses that were barred from prosecution when subsection (16) took effect on July 1, 2006. § 775.15(16)(b); ch. 2006-266, §§ 1, 2, at 2823-24, Laws of Fla.; see also Bryson v. State, 42 So.3d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that “[t]he legislature can extend the limitations period without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws if it ... does so *1289before prosecution is barred by the old statute” (alteration in original) (quoting Andrews v. State, 392 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980))).

On count three, the State charged Mr. Lawson with abuse of an elderly person under section 825.102(1). As with the charge of lewd or lascivious battery, the applicable statute of limitations for prosecution of that crime is three years, and the limitations period ran on January 25, 2006. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because the information was not filed until November 20, 2008, the State did not commence prosecution on the elder abuse charge until after the limitations period had run. In addition, section 775.15(15)(a) and (16)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), did not extend the limitations period because those subsections do not apply to the offense of abuse of an elderly person.

For these reasons, the judgment and sentences imposed on Mr. Lawson for lewd or lascivious battery on an elderly person and abuse of an elderly person must be vacated and those charges dismissed. We affirm the judgment and sentence imposed on Mr. Lawson for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

KHOUZAM and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Earvin Smith, 241 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2018)
    …use the prosecution was already time-barred before the effective date of the amendment. Smith , 211 So. 3d at 192 n.21 (Emas, J., concurring) (citing ch. 2006-266, § 1, Laws of Fla., codified at § 775.15(16)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) ; Lawson v. State , 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ; Bryson v. State , 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ). Sochor v. State , 619 So. 2d 285, 290 (Fla. 1993) (noting that the statute of limitations "is a defensive matter that must be raised at trial"); State v. Sturdivan , 419 So…
  • Earvin Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    ….15(16)(a)l.-8. However, that amendment is inapplicable to the instant burglary charge, as the prosecution for that offense would have already been barred by the statute of limitations at the time the amendment became effective. See Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). . It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court recently held that the statute of limitations is ordinarily not jurisdictional, and that it will not be treated as such…
  • Lenzy Dixon v. State, 53 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …otherwise expired. The State now concedes that this action could have been dismissed and Mr. Dixon discharged of this crime if the statute of limitations had been raised [*1244] by his attorney as Mr. Dixon requested. See generally Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that subsections 775.15(15) & (16) did not apply where three-year statute of limitations expired on January 25, 2006, and thus prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations). The State does not concede error in th…

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