CHRISTOPHER L. BINNEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant Binney was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. This appeal addresses his Rule 3.850 motion raising multiple grounds for relief, including claims regarding PRR sentencing qualification, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a falsified scoresheet.
The court reversed and remanded on three of four issues: (1) the PRR sentencing issue requires remand for attachment of records or resentencing; (2) the ineffective assistance claims regarding the witness and scoresheet warrant remand for an evidentiary hearing or attachment of conclusively refuting documents; and (3) the insanity defense claim is facially insufficient but Binney may replead. The court affirmed summary denial regarding other unspecified claims.
[1] A defendant may be entitled to relief from a sentence imposed as a prison release reoffender if the defendant does not qualify for such sentencing.
[2] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be based on counsel's failure to inform the defendant that a key eyewitness recanted or failed to witness the event at is…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“First, Binney contends that he does not qualify for sentencing as a prison release reoffender ("PRR") and his sentence is therefore illegal. We reverse the order denying relief and remand for attachment of those portions of the record that conclusively establish that Binney qualifies for PRR sentencing or for resentencing to remove the PRR designation.”
Establishes that the court found the PRR eligibility issue required remand rather than summary denial because it involves factual questions about qualification.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBinney was convicted of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, enhanced to first-degree felony by firearm use. He was sentenced to fifteen year…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion Pursuant To Florida Rule Of Criminal Procedure 3.850 cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant Christopher L. Binney (“Bin-ney”) was convicted of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, enhanced to a first-degree felony by the use of a firearm. He was sentenced in accordance with his plea to fifteen years in prison as a prison releasee reoffender. On April 1, 2010, he filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, enumerating seven grounds for relief. The lower court summarily denied the motion. Of the numerous assertions of error raised by Bin-ney, we believe that four warrant reversal and remand for further proceedings.
*384First, Binney contends that he does not qualify for sentencing as a prison release reoffender (“PRR”) and his sentence is therefore illegal. We reverse the order denying relief and remand for attachment of those portions of the record that conclusively establish that Binney qualifies for PRR sentencing or for resentencing to remove the PRR designation. Williamson v. State, 988 So.2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
Second, Binney contends that he received ineffective assistance ■ of counsel because of trial counsel’s failure to inform him that the State’s “key” eyewitness, James Merrill, Jr., had testified at his deposition that he had not, in fact, witnessed the attack that formed the basis of Binney’s charges. Third, Binney claims that his plea was obtained by the production of a “falsified” scoresheet, which indicated that he could receive forty years in the Department of Corrections were he to go to trial. As to these two claims, we reverse the order denying relief and remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing or the attachment of documents that conclusively refute these claims.
Fourth, Binney claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to advise him of an insanity defense. This claim is facially insufficient because Binney failed to allege that he was actually insane when the offense was committed and failed to attach corroborating evidence. See Luckey v. State, 979 So.2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Gillis v. State, 807 So.2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Baker v. State, 404 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). It is not apparent that these defects cannot be corrected, however, so Binney is entitled to the opportunity to replead this claim. See Luckey, 979 So.2d at 355 (citing Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007)).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
MONACO, C.J. and LAWSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007)
- Luckey v. State, 979 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
- Gillis v. State, 807 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Baker v. State, 404 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Williamson v. State, 988 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)