LAURA LAIDLAW, APPELLANT,
v.
THE KRYSTAL COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A customer who slipped and fell on a wet floor at a restaurant appeals a summary judgment in favor of the restaurant. The appellate court reversed, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether wet floor warning signs were properly posted and visible, precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether wet floor signs were actually posted before the appellant fell and whether they were sufficiently visible to warn of the dangerous condition, precluding the court from resolving the factual dispute at the summary judgment stage.
[1] Summary judgment is precluded when there is even the slightest doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
[2] A court must view the evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A summary judgment should be entered only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and even the slightest doubt as to the existence of such a question precludes summary judgment.”
Establishes the strict standard for summary judgment and that courts must not resolve factual disputes at this stage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant slipped and fell on a wet floor while a customer at the appellee's restaurant. The appellee's employees testified that water was tracked…
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The appellant challenges a final summary judgment entered for the appellee in the appellant’s negligence action, where the appellant alleged that she slipped and *1129fell on a wet floor in the appellee’s restaurant. The appellant’s action was based on the assertion that the appellee had not properly maintained the area, and did not sufficiently warn of the danger. Because the parties’ filings provided factual support for the appellant’s claims, the trial court should not have entered the summary judgment.
The appellee acknowledged that the appellant fell on a wet floor when she was a customer at the appellee’s restaurant. In seeking summary judgment the appellee filed the affidavits of two employees, who indicated that it had been raining and that water was tracked into the restaurant, and that the floor had recently been mopped in the area where the appellant fell. Those employees further indicated that “wet floor” signs were put out before the appellant entered the restaurant. However, the appellant’s deposition indicated that she did not see any “wet floor” signs in the restaurant, until after she fell and mentioned to one of the employees that they needed to put out some signs. That assertion is consistent with the appellant’s interrogatory answers, which likewise indicated that when she fell the floor was slippery and there was no warning that the floor was wet.
A summary judgment should be entered only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and even the slightest doubt as to the existence of such a question precludes summary judgment. Falco v. Copeland, 919 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 660 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), rev. denied, 668 So.2d 602 (Fla.1996). The trial court should not resolve factual questions upon motion for summary judgment and instead must view the evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the opposing party. Id. Furthermore, to obtain a summary judgment the appellee was required to demonstrate the absence of any question of material fact. See Falco; Jackson. The appellee did not satisfy this burden and the court should not have resolved the case by summary judgment.
In entering the summary judgment the trial court suggested that “wet floor” signs had been put out before the appellant fell, and that the appellant did not see them. However, viewing the evidentiary filings and inferences thereon in the manner most favorable to the appellant, the filings could support an assertion that either the signs were not put out until after the appellant fell, or that if put out sooner they were not readily visible and thus did not sufficiently warn of the danger. The trial court’s contrary view does not accord with the notion that the court may not resolve factual disputes on summary judgment, and should indulge all inferences in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment. The court’s further assertion that the appellant did not show that the appellee breached any legal duty, with the court observing that the appellee acted in accordance with its safety manuals, similarly fails to credit the inferences which arise upon the evidentiary submissions, and the legal obligations with regard to maintenance of the premises in a reasonably safe condition, along with the necessity of warning of unsafe conditions. See Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); see also Aaron v. Palatka Mall, 908 So.2d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); St. Josephs Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Mashni v. Lasalle Partners Mgmt., 842 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
The appellant’s claims comport with these theories of negligence, and state a cause of action as to the alleged negligence in the failure to maintain the premises in a *1130reasonably safe condition, and the failure to properly warn of a dangerous condition. There was adequate evidentiary support for the claims, so as to preclude summary judgment.
The appealed order is reversed, and the case is remanded.
BENTON, C.J., and PADOVANO, J., Concur.
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Ramsey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 124 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…5, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “[Summary judgment should be entered only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and even the slightest doubt as to the existence of such a question [*417] precludes summary judgment.” Laidlaw v. Krystal Co., 53 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In order for the Ramseys’ negligence claim to survive summary judgment, they were required to offer evidence tending to show that Home Depot either: (1) failed to warn Mrs. Ramsey of a concealed' danger which was or shoul…
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Feris v. Club Country OF Fort Walton Beach, Inc., 138 So. 3d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…DCA 2013). “Summary judgment should be entered only when there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and even the slightest doubt as to the existence of such a question precludes summary judgment.” Id. at 416-17 (quoting Laidlaw v. Krystal Co., 53 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)). Under section 768.0710(2), Florida Statutes (2009), which was in effect when Fer-is’ cause of action accrued, a plaintiff must plead and prove the following three elements: (a) The person or entity in possession or cont…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pittman v. Volusia Cnty., 380 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Aaron v. Palatka Mall, L.L.C., 908 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Sapio v. State, 630 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- ST. Joseph's Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 660 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Saed Mashni v. LaSALLE P'rs Mgmt. Ltd., 842 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Falco v. Carina Jean Copeland, 919 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)