RHONDA R. WEBBER, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM A. WEBBER, APPELLEE
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Former wife appeals a postdissolution modification order regarding child custody, child support, and alimony. The court affirms most issues but reverses the trial court's imposition of retroactive child support dating to January 2007, holding that retroactive child support obligations may only begin from the date a modification petition is filed, not before.
A trial court may not impose a retroactive child support obligation prior to the filing of a petition for modification. Retroactive child support obligations must begin from the date the modification petition is filed, not from an earlier date when circumstances changed.
[1] A retroactive child support obligation may not be imposed prior to the filing of a petition seeking a modification.
[2] The date of filing a petition for modification of child support determines the commencement of any retroactive child support obligation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a retroactive child support obligation may not be imposed prior to the filing of a petition seeking a modification”
Establishes the core holding that retroactive child support must begin from petition filing date
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties' minor daughter moved in with the former husband William A. Webber in January 2007. The former husband did not file his petition for modif…
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Rhonda D. Webber, the former wife, appeals a postdissolution order regarding modification of child custody, child support, and alimony. We affirm all but one of the issues without comment. However, the trial court erred by imposing a retroactive child support obligation on the former wife dating back to January 2007, and we must therefore reverse on that issue.
The former husband, William A. Webber, did not file his petition for modification of child support until May 25, 2007. Although it is undisputed that the parties’ then-minor daughter moved in with the former husband in January 2007, it is the date of the filing of the former husband’s petition that determines when the retroactive child support obligation began. Both the relevant statute and case law provide that a retroactive child support obligation may not be imposed prior to the filing of a petition seeking a modification. See § 61.14(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that court may modify support order “retroactively to the date of the filing of the action or supplemental action for modification as equity requires”); Musser v. Watkins, 752 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Absent the filing of a petition for modification, [the amount of child support] remain[s] fixed by [the] judgment [of dissolution] and cannot be modified prior to the time a proper petition for modification was filed.”); Torres v. Torres, 739 So.2d 599, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“It is settled that a trial court cannot modify a child support obligation absent a pleading or motion requesting such modification.”).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a retroactive child support obligation on the former wife dating back to January 2007. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter an amended order reflecting that the former wife’s retroactive child support obligation began on May 25, 2007, the date of the filing of the former husband’s petition for modification.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
ALTENBERND and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Alejandra Ivanovich v. Valladarez, 190 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…of December 17th, 2009[,j to, be $533.72 per month.” [*1147] “Both the relevant statute and case law provide that a retroactive child support obligation may not be imposed prior to the filing of a petition seeking a modification.” Webber v. Webber, 56 So. 3d 822, 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that trial court could not. order mother to pay child support retroactive, to date that child moved in with father when father’s petition for modification of child support was filed five months later); see also § 61.…
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Mirabella v. Mirabella (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…tive modification of a support order prior to the date the modification was sought. § 61.14(1)(a) (allowing modification retroactive only "to the date of the filing of the action or supplemental action for modification"); see also Webber v. Webber, 56 So. 3d 822, 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that section 61.14(1)(a) prohibited a trial court's postdissolution modification order from imposing "a retroactive child support obligation . . . prior to the filing of a petition seeking a modification"); Bachman v…
Authorities Cited
- Musser v. Lorrie Nell Watkins, 752 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Torres v. Torres, 739 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)