ALEXANDER WEBSTER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LOUISE WEBSTER, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
MARTIN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2011-03-02
No. 4D09-2497
GROSS, C.J., TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
57 So. 3d 896 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2011) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, holding that the trial court improperly applied the burden of proof by requiring the plaintiff to affirmatively establish causation rather than requiring the defendant to show a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding causation.


Holding

Summary judgment was improperly granted. The trial court misplaced the burden by requiring the plaintiff to establish causation rather than requiring the defendant to affirmatively show a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in a medical malpractice case has a lesser burden than at trial and need not affirmatively prove causation to defeat summary judgment.


Headnotes

[1] Summary judgment in medical malpractice actions should be granted cautiously, requiring a complete absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment…

[2] The proof offered to defeat summary judgment must overcome all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.

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Key Quotes

“in medical malpractice actions, courts should grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant cautiously. A summary judgment is properly rendered only upon showing a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Establishes the stringent standard for granting summary judgment in medical malpractice cases.

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Facts & Procedural History

Webster, as personal representative of Louise Webster's estate, sued Martin Memorial Medical Center for medical malpractice. The trial court granted s…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

*897PER CURIAM.

We reverse the order granting the defendant hospital’s motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. According to the Florida Supreme Court,

in medical malpractice actions, courts should grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant cautiously. A summary judgment is properly rendered only upon showing a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' The proof must be such as to overcome all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

Univ. of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000, 1005 (Fla.1991) (citations omitted). The issue is reviewed de novo. E.g., Holmes v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 891 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

This case is controlled- by Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So.2d 601 (Fla.1966), which explained that the plaintiff has a lesser burden when opposing a motion for summary judgment than when opposing a motion for directed verdict at trial:

At the trial, to be sure, the plaintiff herein would have the burden of proving, not only the acts of negligence, but them causal relationship with the injury alleged. However, unless the record that is considered on motion for summary judgment otherwise shows an absence of such causal relationship, the plaintiff, who is opposing the motion, is under no obligation to put in evidence showing such causal relationship.

Id. at 604. The trial court in this case granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that Webster’s evidence had established “a mere possibility of causation,” which was insufficient and because Webster had failed to produce “factual support” or “any evidence on the element of causation.” It appears that the trial court misplaced the burden and that the defendant hospital failed to establish that there was no issue of fact regarding causation.

In Visingardi, also a medical malpractice case, the defendant doctor argued:

‘On defendant’s motion for summary judgment the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient, substantial, competent, evidentiary support for each and every fact which he must establish in order to prevail. If it appears that he has not, and that a directed verdict would be justified were the case at trial, the trial court must grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant’
“In an attempt to meet his burden to show by expert testimony that defendant had departed from the requisite standard of care, and that this departure proximately caused the edema or Mrs. Visingardi’s death therefrom, plaintiff filed the affidavit m question.”1

Id. at 605. The supreme court rejected the doctor’s argument that equated a plaintiffs burden at summary judgment with the burden of overcoming a motion for directed verdict at trial:

Both passages correctly state the burden of the plaintiff at trial; both are inaccurate as to his burden as the party opposing a motion for summary judgment.

Id. It noted that summary judgment is proper where

the record affirmatively showed that the plaintiff could not possibly prove her case, and not because she had simply *898failed to come forward with evidence doing so.

Id.

The trial court relied on two cases which do not control here, as both involve appeals following jury trials, where no evidence was presented that causally linked the negligence with damages. See Murphy v. Sarasota Ostrich Farm/Ranch, Inc., 875 So.2d 767, 768-769 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Greene v. Flewelling, 366 So.2d 777, 779-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).

On remand, the trial court may reconsider the plaintiffs motion to amend to add a claim for punitive damages under section 768.72, Florida Statutes (2002), since it does not appear that the court decided the motion on its merits, but relied primarily on the fact that the motion was untimely, since it was filed four days before trial.

Reversed.

GROSS, C.J., TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Pitcher v. David J. Zappitell, Zappitell & Kapral, P.A., 160 So. 3d 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
    …, summary judgment may not be granted based on a finding that the plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence of causation. This improperly shifts the burden to the non-movant to establish causation. See Webster v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 So. 3d 896, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). See also O’Malley v. Ranger Constr. Indus., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1053, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“[Sjummary judgment should not be granted based on a non-movant’s failure to meet its trial burden of proof on the issue of causat…
  • Valeera Reed v. Schutz Litig. LLC, 117 So. 3d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …iff[ ] could not possibly prove [her] case, and not because [she] had simply failed to come forward with evidence doing so.” Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citation omitted) (quoting Webster v. MaHin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 So. 3d 896, 897-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)). Applying this standard in Ms. Reed’s legal malpractice case, in order for Schutz’s motion for summary judgment to be granted, Schütz had the burden of proving that Ms. Reed could not possibly prove: (1) Mr. Schütz had…
  • …ry judgment is proper only where “the record affirmatively showed that the plaintiffis] could not possibly prove [their] case, and not because [they] had simply failed to come forward with evidence doing so.” Webster v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 So. 3d 896, 897-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Visingardi v. Tirone, 193 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla.1966)). Analysis Generally, a party who retains an attorney is in privity with that attorney and may bring a negligence action for legal malpractice. Angel, Cohen…

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