JENNIFER KAUFFMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
COMMUNITY INCLUSIONS, INCORPORATED/GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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Claimant appealed a workers' compensation fee award, arguing that the 2009 amendment to section 440.34, Florida Statutes, was misinterpreted by the Judge of Compensation Claims and that the amended statute is unconstitutional. The court affirmed, holding that the statute limits attorney's fees to a percentage of benefits obtained regardless of whether the fee is awarded or merely approved.
Section 440.34(3) limits claimants' attorney's fees to a percentage of benefits obtained based on the formula in subsection (1), regardless of whether the fee is awarded or simply approved by the Judge of Compensation Claims. The amended statute does not violate equal protection, due process, separation of powers, or access to courts guarantees.
[1] A workers' compensation statute limiting attorney's fees to a percentage of benefits obtained, based on a statutory formula, applies regardless of whether the fee is awar…
[2] Constitutional challenges, including equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and access to courts claims, to amendments of workers' compensation attorney's f…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute limits claimants' attorney's fees to a percentage of benefits obtained, based on the formula set forth in subsection (1), and does so regardless of whether the fee is awarded, or simply approved, by the JCC.”
Establishes the court's core holding that the statutory percentage formula applies in all cases, not just when fees are merely approved.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Judge of Compensation Claims found the Employer/Carrier responsible for Claimant's attorney's fees and determined a reasonable fee of $25,075.00, …
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In reaction to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Murray v. Manner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008), the Legislature enacted Council Substitute for House Bill 903, which took effect on July 1, 2009. Ch. 2009-94, § 1, at 1351-52, Laws of Fla. The new law amended section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2008), by deleting “reasonable” before “attorney’s fees” in subsections (1) and (3), and by inserting in subsection (3) the phrase “in an amount equal to the amount provided for in subsection (1) or subsection (7).” Id.
In this case, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the Employer/Carrier responsible for Claimant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(3), Florida Statutes (2009), and found a reasonable attorney’s fee to be $25,075.00. The JCC nevertheless concluded that the amended statute limited the fee to a percentage of benefits obtained, and awarded Claimant’s attorney a fee of $684.41 for obtaining $3,417.03 in benefits. Claimant has appealed, arguing the JCC misinterpreted section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2009), and that, if he interpreted the amended statute correctly, the law is now unconstitutional.
We reject Claimant’s argument that section 440.34 allows attorney’s fees exceeding an amount resulting from application of the formula set forth in section 440.34(1) when the fee is “awarded” rather than merely “approved” by the JCC. Although section 440.34(1) provides that a fee may not be paid for a claimant unless approved by the JCC, section 440.34(3) provides that a claimant is entitled to recover a fee from an Employer/Carrier “in an amount equal to the amount provided for in subsection (1) or subsection (7).” Except in cases where section 440.34(7) applies,1 the statute limits claimants’ attorney’s fees to a percentage of benefits obtained, based on the formula set forth in subsection (1), and does so regardless of whether the fee is awarded, or simply approved, by the JCC.
We reject Claimant’s equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and access to courts challenges to the amended *921statute for the same reasons we rejected similar challenges to section 440.34, as previously amended in 2003, in Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm Beach, 932 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We are, of course, aware that in quashing this court’s decision in Murray v. Manners Health/ACE USA, 946 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the Florida Supreme Court also disapproved of this court’s decisions in Lundy, Campbell v. Aramark, 933 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), and Wood v. Florida Rock Industries, 929 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Murray, 994 So.2d at 1062. The supreme court did not address any constitutional issues in Murray, see id. at 1053, however, and did not cast any doubt on the reasoning used in Lundy, Campbell, and Wood, in rejecting constitutional claims like those made here.
Although the Employer/Carrier argues — not without force — that Claimant, who is, after all, represented by able counsel, does not for that reason have standing to raise these constitutional arguments, our supreme court at least implicitly concluded in Murray that a workers’ compensation claimant has standing to challenge the validity of the fee provisions in section 440.34, even though she herself is adequately represented by counsel., See Murray, 994 So.2d at 1053.
Affirmed.
BENTON, C.J., DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Castellanos v. Next Door Company/Amerisure Ins. Co., 124 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…ld be deemed in violation of several constitutional provisions. Based on our precedent, however, we are bound to conclude that the statute is constitutional, both on its face and as applied. See Kauffman v. Cmty. Inclusions, Inc./Guarantee Ins. Co., 57 So. 3d 919, 920-21 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Campbell v. Aramark & Speciality Risk Servs., 933 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), disapproved on other grounds by Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1062 (Fla.2008); Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm…
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Westphal v. City OF ST. Petersburg/City OF ST. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…onse to Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla.2002), and Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1996), and which specifically referred to those decisions as being "contrary to legislative intent”); Kauffman v. Cmty. Inclusions, Inc./Guarantee Ins. Co., 57 So. 3d 919, 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (recognizing that the Legislature’s deletion of the word "reasonable” in section 440.34 was a direct response to the supreme court’s decision in Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051 (Fla.2008)); Pearson v. Paradise Ford…
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Jacobson v. Se. Pers. Leasing, 113 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…of the amount allowed under this section. Section 440.34(2) begins, “[i]n awarding a claimant’s attorney’s fee, the judge of compensation claims shall consider only those benefits secured by the attorney.” In Kauffman v. Community Inclusions, Inc., 57 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this court held there is no significant difference between fees “awarded” and fees “approved.” Further, section 440.34(3), which once permitted only prevailing claimants (not E/Cs) to tax costs against the nonpre-vailing party,…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Murray v. Mariner Health and ACE USA, 994 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2008)
- Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm Beach & Liberty Ins. Grp., 932 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Wood v. Fla. Rock Indus. & Crawford & Co., 929 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Barney E. Tully, Jr. v. State, 933 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Schwanda v. Woodbine Indus., Inc., 946 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)