RICHARD ALLEN PLAMONDON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Richard Allen Plamondon appeals his probation revocation sentence, challenging the trial court's failure to designate him a youthful offender upon resentencing and its failure to credit time already served on probation. The State concedes error, and the appellate court reverses and remands for resentencing to comply with statutory requirements limiting youthful offender sentences to a maximum of six years with credit for time served.
The court held that once a defendant receives youthful offender status, that status must be continued upon probation revocation, and the maximum sentence is limited to six years with credit for time served. The court also held that time already served on probation must be credited toward any new probation term to ensure the total does not exceed the statutory maximum.
[1] A defendant previously designated as a youthful offender must continue to be sentenced as such upon revocation of probation for a violation of that probation.
[2] A sentence imposed after revocation of probation for a youthful offender is limited to six years, less credit for time served.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[O]nce the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resentence the defendant as a youthful offender for a violation of the probation or community control portion of his youthful offender sentence.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that youthful offender status must be continued upon probation revocation and the defendant must be resentenced as a youthful offender.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlamondon pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious battery in 2002 and was placed on sex offender probation as a youthful offender. In 2009, the trial co…
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Richard Allen Plamondon challenges the sentence he received upon a revocation of probation, and the State properly concedes error. We reverse and remand for resen-tencing.
On October 80, 2002, Plamondon entered a plea to lewd and lascivious battery and was placed on sex offender probation as a youthful offender. On May 8, 2009, the trial court found Plamondon in violation of that probation by committing the technical violation of failing to pay child support.1 The trial court thus revoked Plamondon’s probation and sentenced him to a new five-year term of probation. After filing his notice of appeal, Plamondon moved below to correct sentencing error, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to again designate him a youthful offender when sentencing him after revoking his probation. Because the trial court failed to rule on that motion within sixty days, it is deemed denied. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B), (b)(1)(B).
On appeal, in addition to raising the lack of youthful offender designation, Plamondon argues that the trial court also erred in failing to give him credit for time served on probation. The State concedes error with respect to both issues. We agree.
“[O]nce the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resentence the defendant as a youthful offender for a violation of the probation or community control portion of his youthful offender sentence. A youthful offender’s sentence after revocation of probation or community control is therefore limited to a maximum of six years less credit for time served.”
State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994, 997-98 (Fla.1990) (quoting Watson v. State, 528 So.2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)); see also § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2009) (“[N]o youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a ... technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for *372which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served.”).
Here, Plamondon pleaded to a second-degree felony with a statutory maximum of fifteen years. Because he was sentenced as a youthful offender, under section 958.14, his maximum sentence was limited to six years. “[U]pon revocation of probation, the time a probationer has already served on probation for a given offense must be credited toward any new term of probation imposed for that offense, when necessary to ensure that the total term of probation does not exceed the statutory maximum for that offense.” State v. Summers, 642 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis added). Although the newly imposed five-year term of probation did not exceed the six-year statutory maximum for a youthful offender sentence, combining that five years with the approximately three years and nine months Pla-mondon already has served on probation gives him a total term of probation of nearly nine years.
Accordingly, we reverse Plamondon’s sentence and remand with instructions that he be resentenced as a youthful offender and that his total sentence not exceed the six-year statutory maximum for youthful offenders.
Reversed and remanded.
KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
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- Carder v. State, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1994)
- State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2001)
- THE Florida BAR v. Hiram Lee Bauman, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990)
- State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990)
- Watson v. State, 528 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)