JOAN RUBLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LANCE RUBLE, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
RINKER MATERIAL CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 2011-02-02
No. 3D10-488
Wells, J.
59 So. 3d 137 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2011) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Florida law extinguishes a personal injury claim upon the plaintiff's death, and any wrongful death claim must be brought as a separate action, not as an amendment to the original personal injury complaint.


Holding

A personal injury claim is extinguished upon the plaintiff's death, and a wrongful death claim cannot be brought as an amendment to the original personal injury action but must be filed as a separate lawsuit.


Headnotes

[1] A personal injury claim is extinguished upon the plaintiff's death under Florida Statute § 768.20, and any wrongful death claim must be brought as a separate action rathe…

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Key Quotes

“The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on [the plaintiff's] death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action-it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action.”

Capone v. Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc., cited for the principle that personal injury claims cannot be amended to wrongful death claims after death.

Facts & Procedural History

Joan Ruble, as personal representative of the estate of Lance Ruble, appealed a decision regarding the survival and amendment of a personal injury cla…

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Opinion of the Court
WELLS, Judge.

WELLS, Judge.

Affirmed. See § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing that “[w]hen a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a)(1) (stating that the court may order substitution of the proper parties “[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished”); Capone v. Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc., 56 So.3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on [the plaintiff’s] death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extin*138guished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action-it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action.” See Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc. 314 So.2d 765, 770 (Fla.1975) (upholding section 768.20, and explaining that, “a separate lawsuit for death-resulting personal injuries cannot be brought as a survival action”); ACandS, Inc. v. Redd, 703 So.2d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (plaintiffs personal injury action is extinguished and abated even when the plaintiffs death occurs during the trial of his/her case); Niemi [v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 862 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)], (“holding that, when death is the result of a personal injury, the law of Florida essentially substitutes a statutory wrongful death action for the personal injury action that would otherwise survive under section 46.021).”) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 103 So. 3d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
    …circumstances constituting a felony. § 768.19. We see nothing in this section that requires the filing of a new complaint and forecloses the amendment of an existing complaint. The Third District followed Capone in Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp., 59 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). The Middle District of Florida has disagreed with those cases based on its prediction of how our supreme court would decide the issue. Starling v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (M.D.Fla.2011) (holding that perso…
    1 / 2
  • Ruble v. Rinker Materials Corp., 116 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 2013)
    …LEWIS, J. We have for review Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp., 59 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), which relied upon Capone v. Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc., 56 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (Capone I). This Court granted review of Capone I based on express and direct conflict with Niemi v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 862 So.…
    1 / 2

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