JOHN KARAFILAKIS, ET AL.,
v.
ARISTOCRATIS STAVROULAKIS
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld the appointment of a receiver for partnership property (a sponge-fishing boat) without prior notice in a dissolution suit, holding that such appointment is permissible when partnership assets risk removal beyond the court's jurisdiction.
The appointment of a receiver for partnership property in dissolution proceedings is permissible when the principal partnership asset is a vessel about to be taken beyond the court's jurisdiction, as such appointment serves the same protective function as a writ of ne exeat and is within the trial court's sound discretion.
“whenever the intervention of a court of equity in such matters has become necessary to effect a settlement or closing of the partnership, and it appears that the principal items of partnership property is a vessel about to be taken by one of the parties out upon the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, we think the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances may be likened unto the granting of a writ of ne exeat and is largely to be determined by the same principles”
Establishes the legal principle that receiver appointment in partnership dissolution is justified when partnership assets face removal beyond court jurisdiction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThree partners owned equal one-third interests in a boat named the 'Colonel Lindbergh' used for sponge-gathering in the Gulf of Mexico. A bill of comp…
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Bill of complaint' was filed praying dissolution of a partnership. The subject matter of the suit was' a boat named the “Colonel Lindbergh,” which it was alleged, had been built for the purpose of making trips into the Gulf of Mexico for the purpose of gathering sponges *304on a partnership basis, the boat being a part of the partnership property, each partner owning an undivided one-third interest in it. The court appointed a receiver withoút notice. From that order, and a subsequent order refusing to vacate the receivership, this appeal is taken.
The bill alleges that the boat has been mismanaged in the past and that it was the intention of the defendant, John Karafilakis, to immediately man the boat and take it out into the Gulf of Mexico for the purpose of gathering sponges. Accounting and a winding up of the partnership by ordering a sale of the boat and a distribution of its proceeds; was prayed. Motion to dismiss the bill was interposed in connection with an answer that set up certain, specific defenses to the bill.
While in suits between partners for an accounting, dissolution and settlement after dissolution of the partnership, a receiver for the partnership property is not appointed, as of course, yet whenever the intervention of a court of equity in such matters has become necessary to effect a settlement or closing of the partnership, and it appears that the principal items of partnership property is a vessel about to be taken by one of the parties out upon the high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, we think the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances may be likened unto the granting of a writ of ne exeat and is largely to be determined by the same principles, in order to prevent the likelihood that the jurisdiction of the court may be lost by inadvertence or design by the removal of the vessel beyond the court’s jurisdiction. See Allen v. Hawley, 6 Fla. 142, 63 Am. Dec. 198.
Whether or not the boat' should be held under receivership by being kept in port, or should be operated by the receiver pending the suit, or should be released on bond to *305the partner in control of it, are questions so largely within the Chancellor’s sound discretion to determine as matters of policy, that we find no occasion- to interfere except in a clear case of abuse, which this case does not appear to be. Orders affirmed.
■ Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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State v. Rose, 123 Fla. 544 (Fla. 1936)…ic officer in the performance of a public duty, the relator must have a clear legal right to the enforcement by the officer of that duty and no adequate method of redress other than mandamus must exist. See also in this connection, State v. Blanton, 112 Fla. 303, 150 So. 263; State, ex rel. Hillman, v. Hutchins, in 118 Fla. 220, 158 So. 716; State v. Robles, 111 Fla. 276, 150 So. 247; State v. Duncan, 116 Fla. 193, 150 So. 587. Where relator’s right to mandamus appears doubtful under the pleadings, motion t…
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Puma Enters. Corp. v. Vitale, 566 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…to facilitate accomplishment of purposes of partnership); Insurance Management, Inc. v. McLeod, 194 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (temporary receiver appointed only to preserve property and protect rights of all parties); Karafilakis v. Stavroulakis, 112 Fla. 303, 150 So. 277 (1933) (trial court properly appointed receiver where boat about to be taken beyond court’s jurisdiction); Apalachicola N.R. Co. v. Sommers, 79 Fla. 816, 85 So. 361 (1920) (receivers appointed to prevent fraud or to save property from i…
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Arison Shipping Co. v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 259 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…8, 660. In the case sub judice, [*788] appellants have failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in appointing a receiver for certain funds and records based upon an ex parte hearing without notice. Karafilakis v. Stavroulakis, 112 Fla. 303, 150 So. 277 (1933); Dixie Music Co., Inc. v. Pike, 135 Fla. 671, 185 So. 441, 446-447 (1938). See also: Decumbe v. Smith, 143 Fla. 5, 196 So. 595, 596 (1940); Lieberbaum v. Levine, Fla. 1951, 54 So. 2d 159, 161. Therefore, for the reasons stated a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Allen v. Hawley, 6 Fla. 142 (Fla. 1855)