DANIEL ARIAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Arias appeals his sentence for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, challenging the trial court's imposition of sex offender conditions under Florida Statutes section 948.30. The appellate court reversed the sex offender conditions, holding that such conditions cannot be imposed unless the defendant is convicted of a crime enumerated in section 948.30, and remanded for resentencing.
Sex offender conditions set forth in section 948.30 cannot be imposed as special conditions of probation unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30. The trial court may impose other probation conditions only if they satisfy the Biller test requiring that conditions relate to the underlying charge, have a relationship to the crime of conviction, and are reasonably related to future criminality and rehabilitation.
[1] Sex offender conditions of probation may not be imposed unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30, Florida Statutes.
[2] Conditions of probation must relate to the underlying charge for which the defendant was convicted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is improper to impose sex offender conditions of probation unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30.”
Establishes the primary holding that sex offender conditions require conviction of an enumerated crime
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArias entered a no contest plea to burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery after entering his girlfriend's home at 3:00 a.m. without permission…
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Daniel Arias appeals the sentence imposed after he pled no contest to one count of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery.1 On appeal, Arias challenges the imposition of sex offender conditions as found in section 948.30, Florida Statutes. He argues that those conditions are not related to the crime to which he entered a plea. We find merit to Arias’ contention and reverse and remand for resentencing with further consideration by the court.
In November 2008, Arias entered a no contest plea to the trial court to the charge of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein. The charges stemmed from an incident in which Arias entered his girlfriend’s home at 3:00 a.m. to retrieve his wallet. He did not have permission to enter the house. At the time, Arias’ girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter was home alone. After retrieving his wallet, Arias entered the daughter’s bedroom, asked her questions, and petted her hair without her permission. Because the girl was frightened by Arias’ conduct, she locked herself in the bathroom. Although the crime to which Arias pled is not one of the crimes enumerated in section 948.30, the trial court felt there was a sexual motive to Arias’ actions and imposed as special conditions of probation the sexual offender conditions set forth in section 948.30.
In Sturges v. State, 980 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), our sister court determined that it is improper to impose sex offender conditions of probation unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30. In Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla.1993), the supreme court found that conditions of probation must *105relate to the underlying charge. The Bil-ler court set forth a test for determining whether a special condition of probation is reasonably related to rehabilitation. It explained that a condition of probation is invalid “if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” Id. at 734-35 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)).
In this case, the trial court did not find that Arias was a sexual offender or a sexual predator. We recognize that the court imposed the conditions found in section 948.30 as special conditions of Arias’ probation. We find that this distinction does not negate the holding set forth in Sturges. Accordingly, we reverse only that portion of Arias’ sentence which imposes the sex offender conditions set forth in 948.30 as special conditions of his probation. The trial court may impose a term of probation with or without special conditions that satisfy the Biller test.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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Villanueva v. State, 200 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2016)…review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Villanueva v. State, 118 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), on the question of whether the trial court may order him to undergo mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) therapy after a jury acquitted him of any sexual misconduct. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Fo…1 / 3
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Stapler v. State, 190 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…rt has previously held that trial courts are permitted to impose sex-offender conditions as special conditions, even for crimes not listed in section 948.30(1), when the conditions are reasonably related to the convicted offense. See Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104, 104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734-35 (Fla.1993)). Given the nature of Stapler’s offense, we find there was no error in imposing these several sex-offénder conditions. We likewise find that there was no double-j…
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Snow v. State, 157 So. 3d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…encing, when granting probation to persons convicted of an offense enumerated by the statute. The Fourth and Fifth Districts have held that it is error to impose sex offender probation for an offense not enumerated by section 948.30. Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Sturges v. State, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). However, the Third District has explained that the trial court is not precluded from selectively imposing special conditions of sex offender probation that are reasonably re…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993)
- Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- J.L. v. State, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Sturges v. State, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)