STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SCOTT COLEMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appealed a trial court's suppression order that excluded incriminating statements from Scott Coleman based on a defective Miranda warning. The appellate court reversed, holding that the warning adequately conveyed Miranda rights under the U.S. Supreme Court's standard in Florida v. Powell, which requires only that a warning reasonably convey the required information rather than use specific language.
The court held that the Miranda warning read to Coleman was sufficient under the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Powell because, taken as a whole, the warning reasonably conveyed that Coleman had the right to have an attorney present at the outset of interrogation and at all times. A Miranda warning need not use specific language but must reasonably convey the required information.
[1] A Miranda warning is sufficient if it reasonably conveys to the suspect the right to speak with an attorney during police questioning.
[2] A Miranda warning that advises a suspect of the right to speak with an attorney before questioning, that an attorney will be appointed if indigent, and that the suspect m…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a Miranda warning is sufficient so long as it reasonably conveys the required information to the suspect”
Establishes the governing standard from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Powell for evaluating the adequacy of Miranda warnings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScott Coleman made incriminating statements to police after receiving a Miranda warning. The warning advised Coleman of his right to speak with an att…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Counsel During Interrogation cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an appeal by the State of Florida challenging the trial court’s order suppressing incriminating statements made by the defendant below, Scott Coleman. We reverse.
*583In granting suppression, the trial court found that the Miranda1 warning read to Coleman was defective under State v. Powell, 998 So.2d 531 (Fla.2008), since it did not specifically advise Coleman that he had the right to speak with an attorney during police questioning. However, some months after the trial court’s decision in this case, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Powell. See Florida v. Powell, -U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2010). In doing so, the Supreme Court held that a Miranda warning is sufficient so long as it reasonably conveys the required information to the suspect. Id. at 1204.
We believe that the warning form read to Coleman in this case adequately conveyed his Miranda rights. Relevant to the issue before us, the form advised Coleman that he had the right to speak with an attorney before talking with law enforcement; that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed before questioning; and that he could, at any time, exercise these rights and decline to answer any questions or make any statements. In combination, these warnings reasonably conveyed to Coleman that he had the right to have an attorney present at the outset of the interrogation and at all times. The warning as a whole was therefore sufficient under the Supreme Court’s decision in Powell. See id. at 1205; State v. Powell, 66 So.3d 905, 2011 WL 2374612 (Fla. 2011); see also Rigterink v. State, 66 So.3d 866, 2011 WL 2374188 (Fla.2011).
Accordingly, we reverse the order of suppression and remand the cause for further proceedings.2 See State v. Owens, 41 So.3d 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GRIFFIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (U.S. 2010)
- Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011)
- State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2008)
- State v. Shuttleworth, 927 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- State v. Powell, 66 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2011)
- State v. Hervey Lee Owens, 41 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)