DAIL WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dail Wright appeals his conviction and 25-year mandatory minimum sentence under Florida's Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act, arguing the statute's use of the term "victimized" is unconstitutionally vague. The Third District Court of Appeal affirms, holding that the statute's definition of "victim" in chapter 794.011 provides sufficient clarity when read in context.
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The definition of "victim" in chapter 794.011 as "a person who has been the object of a sexual offense" provides sufficient clarity when read in context with section 794.0115(2)(c), encompassing both the adult victim and the minor child who was victimized by witnessing the sexual assault of his mother.
[1] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague when its terms can be understood by reference to definitions provided within the same chapter.
[2] The term "victimized" in the context of the Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act is sufficiently defined by the general definition of "victim" as a person who has been th…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The definitions at the beginning of chapter 794.011 define "victim" as "a person who has been the object of a sexual offense." Reading this specific definition in the context of § 794.0115(2)(c) clearly encompasses Wright's offense of 1) committing an enumerated offense (sexual battery) against the adult victim, and 2) committing a sexual offense against the minor child, i.e., "victimizing" the minor child by sexually assaulting his mother in front of him.”
The court's rationale for finding the statute sufficiently clear by applying the statutory definition of "victim" to the term "victimized"
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright waived his Miranda rights and confessed to burgling a victim and sexually assaulting her in front of her minor child. He was convicted of multi…
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Dail Wright appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence. We affirm.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Wright confessed to the police to burglarizing the victim, as well as to sexually assaulting her in front of her minor child. He went to trial and was convicted of burglary with assault or battery; two counts of sexual battery with no serious injury; one count of attempted sexual battery with no serious injury; lewd and lascivious exhibition on a child under sixteen; child abuse with no bodily harm; and credit card theft. As to one of the sexual battery counts, the State charged Wright pursuant to section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009), the Dangerous Sexual Felony Offender Act, because he committed a sexual battery on the adult victim as well as victimized another person, the victim’s minor child, by committing the act in front of the child.
Prior to trial, the defense argued that the statute is unconstitutional because the term “victimized” in subsection (c) is vague. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. The jury convicted Wright as charged, and the court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years pursuant to section 794.0115(2)(c) (2009).1
*1093Wright argues that subsection (c) provides no definition for the term “victimized” and as such it is unconstitutionally vague. Wright argues that a person could be convicted and sentenced under this statute if he or she committed an unrelated misdemeanor in addition to one of the enumerated offenses. We disagree. The definitions at the beginning of chapter 794.011 define “victim” as “a person who has been the object of a sexual offense.” Reading this specific definition in the context of § 794.0115(2)(c) clearly encompasses Wright’s offense of 1) committing an enumerated offense (sexual battery) against the adult victim, and 2) committing a sexual offense against the minor child, i.e., “victimizing” the minor child by sexually assaulting his mother in front of him. The charges of lewd and lascivious exhibition on a child under sixteen and child abuse with no injury, clearly satisfy the statute’s requirements for being “victimized” under subsection (c) when read together with the statute’s definition of “victim.” The statute is not unconstitutionally vague and we thus affirm Wright’s convictions and sentence.
Affirmed.
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Issac Nicholas Ray Fleming v. State, 75 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…ing did not use a firearm. By forcing the husband to watch Fleming sexually assault the victim, Fleming "[vjictimized more than one person during the course of the criminal episode applicable to the offense[.]” § 794.0115(2)(c). See Wright v. State, 65 So. 3d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).…