BILLY RAY CHANCE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that the petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was procedurally barred due to untimeliness and lack of good cause for an extension.
[1] A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be filed within two years after the judgment and sentence becomes final on direct review, absent an a…
[2] A court may extend the time for filing a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel upon a showing of good cause, provided the request for extension is…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner sought an enlargement of time to file a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which was filed after the two-year d…
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By motion mailed from his place of confinement on June 6, 2011, Billy Ray Chance seeks an enlargement of time to file a petition asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. We have treated the motion as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for purposes of exercising our jurisdiction in the matter.
Mandate in petitioner’s direct appeal issued on May 26, 2009. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5) provides that with one exception not implicated here, a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel shall not be filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence becomes final on direct review. Thus, petitioner’s last day for timely raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was May 26, 2011.
In the analogous context of motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which also are subject to a two-year time limitation, a court may extend the time for filing a motion under that rule upon a showing of good cause if the request for an extension is made before the expiration of the two-year period specified in rule 3.850. See State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458 (Fla.2003). Assuming for present purposes that an appellate court can likewise extend the time for filing a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we conclude that petitioner has nonetheless failed to demonstrate an entitlement to that relief. Petitioner’s motion was filed after expiration of the time for filing of a petition asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective, and more to the point, we conclude that petitioner has failed to establish good cause to extend the time, even if his request had been timely made.
Accordingly, petitioner’s request for an enlargement of time is denied, and to the extent his motion has been treated as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we conclude that it is procedurally barred by rule 9.141(d)(5), and deny it as such.
VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Mendoza v. State, 224 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…me final on direct review, we dismiss Mendoza’s petition as procedurally barred under rule 9.141(d)(5).2 See Melara v. State, 997 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); see also Burroughs v. State, 65 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Chance v. State, 65 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We caution Mendoza that the filing of any further procedurally barred petitions claiming appellate counsel was ineffective may result in the imposition of sanctions including but not limited to an order from this Court prohibiti…
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Alvoid Hartley v. State, 151 So. 3d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…e as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for purposes of exercising our jurisdiction. However, we find that petitioner has failed to establish good cause to extend the time for filing such a petition. See Chance v. State, 65 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Accordingly, we deny relief and dismiss this proceeding. VAN NORTWICK, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.…
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Torres v. State, 2017 WL 1908371 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…judgment and sentence became final, we dismiss the petition as procedurally barred under rule 9.141(d)(5). See Mendoza v. State, 224 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); see also Burroughs v. State, 65 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Chance v. State, 65 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Mahlard K. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2003)