JOHN R. KEELER, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA FERNANDA KEELER, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed a contempt order and purge amount but reversed the criminal contempt finding because the trial court failed to make a separate affirmative finding of present ability to pay based on current circumstances rather than past history.
A trial court must make a separate, affirmative finding of present ability to pay a purge amount based on current circumstances, not merely on the contemnor's history of obtaining funds.
[1] A trial court finding contempt with incarceration must make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possesses present ability to comply with purge conditions,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If incarceration is deemed appropriate, the court must make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possesses the present ability to comply with the purge conditions set forth in the contempt order.”
Florida Supreme Court standard for contempt orders requiring incarceration and purge amounts
John Keeler was found in contempt of court and ordered to pay a purge amount of $131,500, which he subsequently paid. The trial court's finding of abi…
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John Keeler appeals an order entered on June 10, 2010, finding him in contempt of court, ordering his incarceration and providing a purge amount of $131,500. He paid the purge amount. Because of delays in the briefing schedule, this matter was not heard for oral argument until May 11, 2011. We affirm the order under appeal in all respects except the trial court’s finding the husband in criminal contempt. We can understand the frustration of the trial court with all the evidence that was presented, but the court’s finding that Mr. Keeler had the present ability to pay was “based upon his history of obtaining funds when needed.” In Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274, 1279 (Fla.1985), the Florida Supreme Court stated:
“If incarceration is deemed appropriate, the court must make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possesses the present ability to comply with the purge conditions set forth in the contempt order. In determining whether the contemnor possesses the ability to pay the purge amount, the trial court is not limited to the amount of cash immediately available to the contemnor; rather, the court may look to all assets from which the amount might be obtained.”
From the trial court’s order, it seems the judge focused on the past, not the present ability to pay. We therefore vacate the contempt but otherwise affirm. We need not remand the case because the husband has paid the purge amount already.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
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Nation v. Boling, 206 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…y obtaining a loan from relatives was “outrageous”) (citing Perez v. Perez, 599 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)). Moreover, Nation’s past ability to make contempt payments should not be taken into consideration in this case. See Keeler v. Keeler, 66 So. 3d 1081, 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (reversing trial court’s finding that Keeler’s ability to pay was “based upon his history of obtaining funds when needed” because the court improperly “focused on the past, not the present ability to pay”). Because the cont…
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Authorities Cited
- Eugenia Bowen & the Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1985)