ANTONIO MAURICE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Antonio Maurice Williams challenges his sentence for burglary of a dwelling, which imposed forty-eight months in prison as a condition of probation. The court held that the original sentence was illegal under Florida Statutes section 948.03(2), which limits incarceration as a condition of probation to 364 days, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence after a notice of appeal was filed.
The original sentence was illegal because it violated section 948.03(2), which limits incarceration as a condition of probation to 364 days and restricts such incarceration to specific facilities, not state prison. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Williams after the notice of appeal became effective on May 14, 2009, and also lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence through the motion to correct sentencing error because it failed to rule within the required sixty-day period.
[1] A period of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation cannot exceed 364 days and must be served in a designated facility, not state prison.
[2] A trial court loses jurisdiction to correct a sentence once a notice of appeal has been filed and becomes effective.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if the trial court imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a county facility, a probation and restitution center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, a probation program drug punishment phase I secure residential treatment institution, or a community residential facility owned or operated by any entity providing such services.”
This statute sets the legal limits on incarceration as a condition of probation, which Williams' sentence violated by imposing 48 months.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams entered an open plea and was sentenced on May 6, 2009, to ten years' probation with a condition that he serve forty-eight months in prison. D…
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Antonio Maurice Williams appeals his judgment and sentence for burglary of a *250dwelling. Williams entered an open plea and challenges the sentence imposed of ten years’ probation with a condition of probation that he serve forty-eight months in prison. The State properly concedes that the original sentence was illegal. The trial court twice attempted to correct the sentence, and the State also properly concedes that the trial court did not have jurisdiction either time it attempted to correct the sentence. Accordingly, we reverse Williams’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
At the sentencing hearing held on May 6, 2009, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years’ probation with a condition that Williams serve forty-eight months in prison. Defense counsel questioned whether the period of incarceration as a condition of probation could exceed a year. The trial court stated that it would look into the issue and that it could modify the sentence within ten days if the structure of the sentence was technically incorrect.
Williams prematurely filed a notice of appeal on May 12, 2009. The notice became effective to vest jurisdiction in this court when the trial court rendered the judgment and sentence on May 14, 2009. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(0- On May 19, 2009, the trial court rendered an order of disposition indicating that Williams’ sentence was modified to forty-eight months in prison to be followed by seventy-two months of probation. On June 1, 2009, the trial court rendered an order of probation indicating Williams was sentenced to forty-eight months in prison to be followed by seventy-two months of probation.
On December 22, 2009, Williams filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court to modify the sentence after the notice of appeal was filed. On March 5, 2010, the trial court entered an order vacating the previous judgment and sentence. On March 10, 2010, the trial court rendered a written judgment and sentence ordering Williams to serve forty-eight months in prison to be followed by seventy-two months of probation.
Williams correctly argues and the State properly concedes that Williams must be resentenced because his original sentence was illegal and the trial court did not have jurisdiction either time it attempted to correct the sentence. Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that if the trial court
imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, the period shall not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a county facility, a probation and restitution center under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, a probation program drug punishment phase I secure residential treatment institution, or a community residential facility owned or operated by any entity providing such services.
Thus, the sentence imposing forty-eight months in prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) because it exceeded 364 days and because the trial court ordered that Williams serve the time in state prison.
The trial court was without jurisdiction to resentence Williams after the notice of appeal was filed and became effective on May 14, 2009. See Knapp v. State, 741 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (recognizing that the circuit court has no jurisdiction to correct a sentence while an appeal of the sentence is pending). The trial court was also without jurisdiction to correct the sentence pursuant to the motion to correct sentencing error because the trial court did not rule on the motion within sixty days and did *251not extend the period of time to rule on the motion before the sixty-day period expired. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B); Conroy v. State, 938 So.2d 687, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Jackson v. State, 793 So.2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thus, the order granting relief and the new judgment and sentencing documents are a nullity. See Jackson, 793 So.2d at 118.
Therefore, we reverse Williams’ sentence for burglary of a dwelling and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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Kiefer Ruben Filppula v. State, 106 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…4 days.” Additionally, the statute provides that incarceration as a condition of probation must be completed in a county facility, a probation or restitution center, or a community residential [*47] facility. § 948.03(2); see also Williams v. State, 67 So. 3d 249, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that sentence of forty-eight months in state prison as a condition of probation violated section 948.03(2) and was an illegal sentence). Here, the court imposed two years’ incarceration in Florida State Prison as a c…
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Lavender v. State, 203 So. 3d 969 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…ing errors by granting Lavender’s motion to correct sentencing error, the trial court did- not do so within the sixty-day window afforded by rule 3.800(b)(2)(B). Consequently, the order granting Lavender’s motion is a nullity. See Williams v. State, 67 So. 3d 249, 250-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Special terms and conditions of probation must be imposed by oral pronouncement at sentencing. § 948.039, Fla. Stat. (2014).: Here, the requirement of maintaining a daily activity log is not statutorily authorized under…
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Romano v. State, 205 So. 3d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…the violation. Although the trial court granted the rule 3.800(b) motion, on July 22, 2015, it did so outside of the sixty days in which the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B); Williams v. State, 67 So. 3d 249, 250-51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Therefore, the trial court’s order is a nullity. See Williams, 67 So. 3d at 251. Romano’s first claim that the special conditions should be stricken is without merit. Although the requirement that Romano pay for testing…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robbie Jackson v. State, 793 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Wilson v. State, 741 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Knapp v. State, 741 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)