VMD FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. AND BPS R.E. HOLDINGS LLC, APPELLANTS,
v.
CB LOAN PURCHASE ASSOCIATES, LLC, A NEW JERSEY LIMITED LIABILITY, AJ PETROLEUM II, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, FLOVEST, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL, INC. D/B/A ROBERT HALF LEGAL AND D/B/A THE AFFILIATES A/K/A AFFILIATES, A DELAWARE CORPORATION QUALIFIED TO DO BUSINESS IN FLORIDA, DAVID HAYES, ROSALEE ROGOVIN, AND UNKNOWN TENANT, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
VMD and BPS, junior lienholders in a mortgage foreclosure, were denied due process when the trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure based on a settlement agreement between CB Loan and AJ Petroleum to which VMD and BPS were not parties. The appellate court reversed, holding that VMD and BPS had a constitutional right to defend their subordinate interests.
The court reversed the final judgment of foreclosure, holding that VMD and BPS, as non-parties to the new settlement agreement, were entitled to due process protection requiring them to be given a real opportunity to be heard and defend their interests in an orderly procedure before judgment was rendered against them. The court also held that the subsequent judicial sale was invalid as it was pursuant to a reversed judgment.
[1] A final judgment of foreclosure entered pursuant to a settlement agreement is improper when junior lienholders who are not parties to the agreement are denied an opportun…
[2] Due process requires that a party be given a real opportunity to be heard and defend in an orderly procedure before judgment is rendered against them.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because VMD and BPS were not parties to the settlement agreement, we reverse.”
The court's core holding that VMD and BPS could not be bound by a settlement agreement they did not enter
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCB Loan filed a foreclosure complaint against AJ Petroleum, the first mortgagor, and junior lienholders VMD and BPS. An initial settlement agreement w…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Settlement Agreement Enforceability cases and more on FLexlaw
This case began with a mortgage foreclosure complaint filed by CB Loan Purchase Associates, LLC (“CB Loan”), against the first mortgagor, AJ Petroleum II, LLC (“AJ Petroleum”), and junior lien-holders, VMD Financial Services, Inc. (“VMD”) and BPS R.E. Holdings, LLC (“BPS”). The trial court subsequently entered a final judgment of foreclosure pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into between only CB Loan and AJ Petroleum. This appeal was filed by VMD and BPS. Because VMD and BPS were not parties to the settlement agreement, we reverse.
In its complaint, CB Loan sought to foreclose upon a first mortgage that it held on the subject property. VMD and BPS both held subordinate interests in that property. Subsequent to filing the complaint, CB Loan, AJ Petroleum, VMD and BPS entered into a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement acknowledged that VMD and BPS held junior mortgages and granted BPS the right to receive notices of default, as well as the right to cure. The agreement was entered as an agreed order on April 28, 2009.
On February 3, 2010, CB Loan filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and to re-institute the foreclosure action. At the hearing held on this motion, and before the parties had presented any evidence, CB Loan stated that it was prepared to announce on the record the terms of a new settlement that it had reached with AJ Petroleum. VMD and BPS informed the trial court that they had not agreed to any new settlement agreement; however, the trial court permitted the new agreement to be read into the record. The new agreement called for *999entry of a final judgment of foreclosure and granted an entity designated by AJ Petroleum a five-year option to purchase the property. VMD and BPS objected to this and requested the opportunity to defend their interests in the property and to present evidence of their attempts to cure. The trial court declined this request, adopted the new settlement agreement and issued a final judgment of foreclosure. The property was subsequently sold at a judicial sale. VMD and BPS now appeal, arguing that preventing them from defending their interest in the property denied them due process.
“Whether the trial court has complied with the guarantees of due process is subject to de novo review.” Dep’t of Revenue ex reí Poynter v. Bunnell, 51 So.3d 543, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Due process requires that a party ‘“be given ... a real opportunity to be heard and defend in an orderly procedure, before judgment is rendered against him.’ ” Burch v. City of Lakeland, 891 So.2d 654, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla.1991)). VMD and BPS were completely denied the opportunity to defend their interests in the property. Further, VMD and BPS were not parties to the new settlement agreement and did not agree to, nor were they bound by, its terms. Cf Seminole Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 985 So.2d 615, 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“As a general rule,
... stipulations are binding on the parties who enter them.... ”). Thus, entry of the final judgment of foreclosure was error because it adjudicated the rights of VMD and BPS without allowing them the opportunity to defend their interests. See, e.g., Morroni v. Peeples, 872 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (reversing order of dismissal that occurred pursuant to stipulation agreement because the appellant was not a party to the stipulation and was not bound by it). Our reversal of the final judgment of foreclosure renders sale of the property invalid. See, e.g., Haren v. Sundie, 233 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (“[A] sale pursuant to a judgment which has been reversed is not a valid sale.”).
Reversed.
GROSS, J., and STREITFELD, JEFFREY E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (31 total)
-
Julia v. Julia, 146 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…pretrial order, we will not discuss those issues but begin by addressing the Wife’s other arguments regarding due process violations. We review a possible violation of due process de novo. See VMD Fin. Sens., Inc. v. CB Loan Purchase Assocs., LLC, 68 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). “Due process requires that a party be given the opportunity to be heard and to testify and call witnesses on the party’s behalf ... and the denial of this right is fundamental error.” Minaban v. Husted, 27 So. 3d 695, 698…
-
A.M. v. Dep't OF Child. & Families, 223 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…her due process rights by holding the termination of parental rights trial while she was incompetent. -We review the issue of whether the trial court violated the mother’s due process rights de novo. See VMD Fin. Servs. v. CB Loan Purchase Assocs., 68 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The Due Process Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions encompasses both substantive and procedural due process. See M.W. v. Dams, 756 So. 2d 90, 97 (Fla. 2000). A person’s substantive due process rights “pro…
-
Skelton v. Lyons, 157 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…ed because he was not served with Lyons’s objection or provided notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing setting aside the second foreclosure sale. We review this issue de novo. See VMD Fin. Servs., Inc. v. CB Loan Purchase Assocs., LLC, 68 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Poynter v. Bunnell, 51 So. 3d 543, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). Second, he argues that the trial court erred in setting aside the foreclosure sale. We review this issue for an abuse of discreti…
Previewing 3 of 31 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dep't OF LAW Enf't v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991)
- Dep't OF Revenue v. Bunnell, 51 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Prot., 985 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
- Burch v. City OF Lakeland, 891 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Gulf Cities GAS Corp. v. Tangelo Park Serv. Co., 233 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Haren v. Sundie, 233 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Morroni v. Peeples, 872 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)