NONI STINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Noni Stinson appealed her second-degree murder conviction, raising issues about the denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal based on self-defense and the trial court's jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter by act. The court affirmed the denial of the motion but reversed and remanded for a new trial due to fundamental error in the jury instruction.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal because the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome appellant's prima facie case of self-defense. However, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury instruction on manslaughter by act constituted fundamental, reversible error by suggesting that intent to kill is an element of that crime.
[1] If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of self-defense, the State must overcome the defense by rebuttal or by inference in its case in chief.
[2] The question of self-defense is one of fact for the jury to decide where the facts are disputed.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a defendant [establishes] a prima facie case of self-defense, the state must overcome the defense by rebuttal, or by inference in its case in chief.”
Establishes the State's burden when self-defense is raised as an issue
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNoni Stinson shot and killed her husband, Solomon Stinson. She claimed self-defense. The State presented evidence that appellant lied to the 911 opera…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Manslaughter By Act Jury Instruction cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant, Noni Stinson, challenges her conviction for murder in the second degree with a firearm. Appellant raised three issues on appeal, two of which merit discussion. First, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal because appellant established a prima facie case of self defense, and the State failed to present evidence rebutting appellant’s theory of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed below, we affirm as to this issue. See Rasley v. State, 878 So.2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA2004).
Second, appellant asserts the trial court fundamentally erred in giving the standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act, as it erroneously suggests that intent to kill is an element of the crime. We find that giving this instruction constituted fundamental error and reverse for a new trial.
We have addressed the issue of the State’s burden of proof where the issue of self defense is raised. In Rasley, this court stated:
As applied to the theory of self-defense in particular, the following rules should be taken into consideration regarding the state’s burden: The state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See Brown v. State, 454 So.2d 596, 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). “If a defendant *292establishes a prima facie case of self-defense, the state must overcome the defense by rebuttal, or by inference in its case in chief.” See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Id. at 476. The court further stated,
[A]n appellate court, in reviewing the record in a case where such defense is interposed, is required to heed the rules that “[t]he question of self defense is one of fact, and is one for the jury to decide where the facts are disputed.” Dias v. State, 812 So.2d 487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing Scholl v. State, 94 Fla. 1138, 115 So. 43, 44 (1927)). “A motion for judgment of acquittal should not be granted unless ‘the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law.’ ” See Hernandez v. State, 842 So.2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), quoting Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44, 45 (Fla.1974).
[T]he state submitted evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that appellant acted out of anger and jealousy because she had discovered that the husband/victim was having an extramarital affair. The evidence, in its entirety, was susceptible of two views, either justifiable self-defense, or an act arising out of jealousy and anger from the fact that the husband was having an affair.
Id. at 476-77.
In the instant case, the State presented evidence that appellant (1) lied to both the 911 operator and the police about her involvement in the shooting; (2) hid the murder weapon; and (3) had recently discovered evidence that her husband had been unfaithful. Additionally, one of the police officers testified that appellant did not appear disheveled and did not have any bruises that would indicate that she had recently been the victim of domestic violence. Pursuant to Rasley, this evidence was sufficient to sustain the State’s burden.
We are required to reverse, however, based on the trial court’s instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter by act. The trial court stated that the State was required to prove that “Noni Jamil Stinson intentionally caused the death of Solomon Stinson.” This constitutes fundamental, reversible error. Montgomery v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D360, 70 So.3d 603, 2009 WL 350624 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 12, 2009) (on motion for rehearing); see also Burroughs v. State, 997 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Davis v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D131, — So.3d -, 2009 WL 47384 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 9, 2009).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Tamra Suzanne Leasure v. State, 105 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…lver and there was a clear discrepancy between the sizes of the couple. Additionally, Leasure was relatively sober and in good health while Tilley was extremely intoxicated and plagued by cirrhosis and other maladies. The facts of Stinson v. State, 69 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), review denied, 70 So. 3d 587 (Fla.2011), are analogous to those in this case. In Stinson, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm. Id. at 291. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in denyin…
-
Rushing v. State, 133 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…undamental error in Montgomery’s case. This court has relied on our holding in Montgomery to reverse a number of convictions where the erroneous jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter was given. See, e.g., Stinson v. State, 69 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Hardee v. State, 69 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ward v. State, 12 So. 3d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). We have also held that the standard jury instruction for the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter by act suffers…
-
Early v. State, 223 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…state failed to rebut his reasonable hypothesis of self-defense. The question of whether a defendant acted in justifiable self-defense is generally a question for the jury. Morgan v. State, 127 So. 3d 708, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Stinson v. State, 69 So. 3d 291, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “Once the defense presents a prima facie case of self-defense, the state must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Morgan, 127 So. 3d at 717; Stinson, 69…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)
- Montgomery v. State, 70 So. 3d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Emory Jack Brown, Jr. v. State, 454 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Tige Scholl v. State, 94 Fla. 1138 (Fla. 1927)
- Dias v. State, 812 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- David Christian Berg, M.D. v. DiPAOLO, 997 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
- GIL Eriksen Props., LLC v. Pompano Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency, 997 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)