ROY E. ADAMS, II, AND JOANNE ADAMS, APPELLANTS,
v.
MITCHELL G. HANCOCK, INC., APPELLEE
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Roy and Joanne Adams appealed a summary judgment dismissing their negligent injury claim against Mitchell G. Hancock, Inc. based on lack of vicarious liability for an employee's off-duty automobile accident. The court affirmed, holding that the employee was not acting within the scope of employment when the collision occurred because the 'going and coming' statutory exception applied.
The court held that the employee was not acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident because the 'going and coming' provision of Florida Statutes section 440.092(2) applied, and the 'dual purposes exception' did not apply under the undisputed material facts.
[1] An employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an employee committed within the scope of employment.
[2] The "going and coming rule" establishes that an employee traveling to or from work in their own vehicle is generally not acting within the scope of employment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where there are no factual disputes, whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment is a question of law.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining scope of employment when facts are undisputed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJonathan Nowlin was part of a four-person work crew employed by Hancock engaged in a construction project in Rockledge. Nowlin's supervisor picked up …
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Roy E. Adams, II, and Joanne Adams appeal the trial court’s final summary judgment in favor of Mitchell G. Hancock, Inc. (hereinafter “Hancock”). The final judgment found that Hancock was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee, Jonathan Nowlin, because Now-lin was not engaged in the course and scope of his employment when his automobile collided with a vehicle driven by Roy Adams.
The facts are undisputed. Hancock’s corporate office is located in Okeechobee, and its crews often work for extended periods at other locations. Hancock provides its work crews with transportation to the job sites, hotel accommodations, and a monetary per diem. Employees who elect to drive their own vehicles to the out-of-town job sites are not reimbursed for any travel expenses, because Hancock provides transportation at its expense.
Nowlin was part of a four-man work crew engaged in an extended construction project in Rockledge. Nowlin’s supervisor would pick up the crew each morning and drop them off each evening at the motel where they stayed. The supervisor drove home nightly to St. Cloud. On Wednesday of the week in question, Nowlin asked permission to travel home to Vero Beach that night to see his girlfriend, but the request was refused. After work, the supervisor drove home to St. Cloud as usual, and assumed Nowlin stayed in Rockledge that night. At about 5:54 a.m. on Thursday, the supervisor called Nowlin1 and learned that, despite his directions to the contrary, Nowlin went to Vero Beach the night before and was in the process of driving back to Rockledge. The supervisor indicated he was about ten minutes in travel time behind Nowlin and would meet up with him at the motel. Shortly after the phone call, Nowlin was involved in the collision which took his life and injured Adams.
Where there are no factual disputes, whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment is a question of law. Sussman v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 557 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (citation omitted). We agree that the “going and coming” provision of section 440.092(2), Florida Statutes (2009), operated to establish, as a matter of law, that Nowlin was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Further, under these material undisputed facts, the “dual purposes exception” did not apply. See generally Gilbert v. Publix Supermkts., Inc., 790 *1115So.2d 1057 (Fla.2001). Accordingly, the final summary judgment in favor of Hancock is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORPY, COHEN and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
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Indoneisia Peterson v. Mohamed Ibrahim & Cisco Sys., Inc., 320 So. 3d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)…st Mr. Ibrahim. - 3 - II. Discussion A. Standard of Review & Governing Law "Where there are no factual disputes, whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment is a question of law." Adams v. Mitchell G. Hancock, Inc., 74 So. 3d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Sussman v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 557 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)). "The standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo." Ma…
Authorities Cited
- Sussman v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 557 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Gilbert v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 790 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2001)