KHUDOURIE CHAACHOU; PARIS CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; COLUMBIA CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND THE K. CHAACHOU FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,

v.

FREDERICKA PHILLIPS CHAACHOU, APPELLEE

PEARSON, Judge.

This cause has been before the Supreme Court of Florida upon several occasions. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 830; Chaachou v. Chaachou, Fla. 1957, 92 So.2d 414. An appeal is now in that court upon the merits of the cause. A statement of the factual background is therefore unnecessary. One of the main points designated as error by the defendant, who is appellant in the Supreme Court and in this court, in the last mentioned appeal, was the refusal of the chancellor to allow one Wead A. .Summerson to testify at the trial. Defendant moved for leave to take the deposition of Wead A. Summerson pending the determination of the interlocutory appeal in the Supreme Court. Plaintiff opposed the motion and a hearing was had. The chancellor refused to allow defendant to take 'Summerson’s deposition pending the appeal and entered an order denying the motion. It is from this last order denying defendant’s motion for leave to take the deposition that the interlocutory appeal to this court is now taken.

It should be noted that the appellee has not moved for a transfer of this interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court and has filed a full and complete brief upon the procedural question involved.

Appellant’s motion was made pursuant to Rule 1.22(b), 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The chancellor found by his order *821that the motion itself was legally insufficient and denied the same without exercising his discretion to grant or deny the motion. The appellee urges the insufficiency of the motion upon the ground that the motion was not verified. A careful reading of Rule 1.22, supra, reveals that the requirement for verification is contained in the portion of ■the rule providing for depositions before .action.2 The reference is to a petition. On the other hand, in subsection “b”, supra, ■where the reference is to a motion there is no requirement for verification. Such .a distinction has sense because in the first ■situation the verified petition sets the court’s ■machinery for preservation of testimony in operation, and in the second situation the motion is for an order which should be granted as a matter of course, unless the trial judge, who is already familiar with •the case, finds that there is some reason that the preservation of testimony is not proper. See 4 Moore’s, Federal Practice 1842 (2nd ■ed. 1950).

Reversed and remanded.

CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HORTON, J., concur.